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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Much has been written, especially during the past few years, in the 
area of law as it pertains to the American public schools. Although a 
great many investigations have been made in the area of school law, much 
information remains buried in the maze of legal literature. With the 
change which has taken place in American society as a whole, with the 
change in the concept of public schools, and with the changes in the at-
titudes of the courts toward public schools, it behooves each individual 
dealing with the administration of our public schools to increase his 
knowledge of school law. 
Prior to the 1940's, many teachers and administrators appeared to 
be indifferent to the legal principles relating to public education. 
However, during the last twenty years the body of school law, both stat-
utory and case, has increased severalfold. Many questions have arisen 
pertaining to the rights and responsibilities of the school authorities. 
Several studies have been conducted dealing with the rights, privileges, 
and liabilities of teachers, administrators, and other employees of the 
schools; however, few studies have been undertaken dealing with problems 
relating to the school pupil. 
The pupil is the center of the American system of public education. 
All other aspects of our educational system revolve around the pupil. 
It is, therefore, appropriate that consideration be given to the legal 
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problems encountered in the administration of pupil person..riel. 
The legal relationships of pupils' "rights, 11 privileges, and re-
sponsibilities in con..riection with public school adwission and attendance 
are based on constitutional provisions, statutory law, school board 
rules and regulations, and principles developed from judicial interpre-
tations. Efforts have been made by state governments through the leg-
islatures to provide for and to safeguard the rights of children. The 
recognition.of these rights and the adjustment of school practices to 
operate within the legal framework as established by the statutes and 
the interpretations of these statutes by the courts are of supreme im-
portance to school personnel. While litigation on behalf of pupils is 
not new, in recent years there has been a proliferation of court deci-
sions in this area which are having a profound effect on the American 
public schools. 
This study is concerned with the following: What are some of the 
problems related to admission and attendance of public school pupils 
which have come before the courts for litigation? 
Need for the Study 
With the transferring of attendance in the public schools from the 
status of a privilege or an opportunity for those choosing to accept it 
to a requirement for all pupils, school administrators and boards of 
education are constantly being faced with problarns dealing with liti-
gations relating to pupil person.riel. Hamilton and Mort emphasize that 
with the change in the nature of the school have come misunderstandings 
when they state: 
The transfer of the school from the status of an opport unity 
for those who chose to accept it to a required experience 
for all children brought with it a long train of litigation. 
Questions arose as to where the rights and responsibilities 
of the school authorities began and ended. Also, questions 
arose concerning the responsibilities and rights of parents 
and pupils themselves. The answering of these questions has 
been and still is fraught with that personal conflict that 
makes not only news but also much work for the courts.l 
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Nolte and Linn clearly indicate that litigation is quite prevalent 
in the area of pupil attendance when they state: 
••• one might expect that very few problems related to pupil 
attendance would arise. This area of the law, however, con-
tinues to be one of the fertile areas of litigation in spite 
of the controlling statutory framework. Questions which 
continually come before the courts are indicative of the un-
settled conditions relating to this problem: Under what con-
ditions may instruction of children in the home excuse at-
tendance at the public or private school? May a child be 
admitted to the public school at an earlier age than that 
stipulated by the board of education? Is a board rule re-
quiring vaccination as a prerequisite to admission a legal 
exercise of board power? May the board assign pupils t o 
attend a school f ar from home in contravention of the wishes 
of parents; These and many other related questions contin-
ually arise to plague teachers and administrators, and many 
of these issues reach the courts of the land.2 
During the calendar year 1964, the National Reporter Systam re-
ported 114 cases which were directly concerned with public school pupils . 
Much of this litigation dealt specifically with problerri~ in the area of 
pupil admission and attendance . Recognition of pupils' 11 rights 11 and the 
corresponding adjustments of school practices are of utmost importance 
to school administrators. It is of importance also that parents and 
other laymen understand the legal status of pupils. Along with an 
lRobert R. Hamilton and Paul R. Mort, The Law and Public Educatio:1 
(Brooklyn, 1959), p . 506 . 
2M. Chester Nolte and John Phillip Linn, School Law for Teachers 
(Danville, Ill., 1963) , p . 211 . 
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understanding of the "rights" and responsibilities of the pupils and of 
the parents, the public school officials should have an u,.~derstanding of 
their ·rights and responsibilities. The fact that litigations continue 
in the field of pupil admission and attendance indicates that answers to 
these problems need to be provided. The resolution of many problems can 
be found in the laws and court interpretations of the laws. Because the 
"king can do no wrong" concept is rapidly being abandoned, it becomes 
even more important.for the public school administrator to arm himself 
with information to enable him to make wise decisions of a legal nature. 
Widespread information including.interpretation and clarification 
of points of law, it is felt, will prevent many needless controversies. 
A survey of the literature failed to reveal a study relating to an anal-
ysis of the opinions handed down by the courts regarding pupil admission 
and attendance in the public schools. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of the study is to ferret out, analyze, and present in 
s1.UI1Inary form the principles of law as interpreted by the courts in liti-
gations pertaining to admission and attendance of public school pupils. 
It is hoped that this study will better acquaint the public school a~-
thorities with the legal aspects relating to this area of school ad.min-
istration and will enable them to avoid embarrassing, time-consuming, 
expensive lawsuits. Furthermore, it is hoped that it will help public 
school officials to be better informed on the "rights" and responsi-
bilities of the pupils, the parents, and the school authorities in the 
area of attendance and admission. 
Scope of the Study 
So numerous are litigations related to public school pupils that 
one study cannot cover all the legal aspects pertaining to them. This 
study does not attempt to delve into all matters., but is limited pri-
marily to case reports relating to admission and attendance of public 
school pupils. 
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Inasmuch as court decisions determine the manner in which laws and 
regulations will be legally interpreted, this study is concerned with an 
analysis of the court cases rather than with an analysis of statutory 
laws; it is concerned with analyzing the cases listed in the National 
Reporter System which includes all decisions rendered by state and fed-
eral courts of record dealing with admission and attendance of pupils in 
the public elementary and secondary schools of the United States. Cases 
pertaining to litigation involving private or parochial schools and 
cases dealing with litigation involving institutions of higher learnir1g 
are not a part of this investigationo Although many principles of law 
pertaining to public elementary and secondary school pupils might well 
apply to pupils of private and parochial schools or to pupils enrolled. 
in institutions of higher learri.ing, it is felt that each of these areas 
would be adequate for another study. 
Because the laws under which public schools operate are subjected 
from time to time to different interpretations by the courts., the court 
decisions discussed in this study are of recent date. Generally, the 
cases studied and analyzed are those listed in Fourth, f.if:ch, and Sixth 
Decen.l'l.ial Digests of the American Digest System. Older cases are iI:.·-
cluded only when they are of important historical value, or if they 
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established a principle which has not since arisen before the courts. 
More specifically, the study is concerned -with problams related to: 
(1) requirements for admission and attendance in the public schools, 
(2) grounds for acceptance, rejection, or exclusion of applicants for 
admission, and (3) a board's right to classify, grade, or assign pupils 
to a particular class or school. There is no atte.mpt to s1J111rnarize the 
details of the many laws on the subjects, but rather to examine and pre-
" 
sent general principles which can be gathered from the judicial inter-
pretations. 
Procedure of the Study 
The method used in conducting the study involved a search of legal 
textbooks and of the encyclopedical sources, namely, American Jurispru,-
dence, Corpus Juris, and Corpus Juris Secundum to determine litigation 
which has transpired in the area studied. Use was made of the Fourth, 
Fifth, and Sixth Decennial Digests of the American Digest ~ystem to lo-
cate the cases investigated. An investigation of the original sources 
was conducted by referring to the court opinions and decisions listed 
in the National Reporter §xstem. 
The cases selected were reviewed and analyzed to determine their 
applicability to this study. The pertinent cases., approJd_mately two 
hundred in number, were categorized according to the points of law in-
volved in the litigation into the follo-wi.ng broad areas: (1) pupils' 
11 rights, 11 privileges, and responsibilities for ad.mission and attendance, 
(2) grounds for acceptance, rejection, or exclusion of applicants for 
admission and attendance, and (3) rights of school officials to assign 
or classify pupils. These broad areas were in turn further classified 
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to render them more manageable. A detailed analysis of the facts, de-
cisions, and interpretations was made of all the cases pertinent to this 
investigation. The judicial decisions of the cases u..nder investigation 
were examined to determine legal patterns which have developed. A sum-
mary of these findings and conclusions. is presented in a language tmder-
standable by persons outside the field of law in. Chapter V of this 
study. 
Glossary of Terms 
Undoubtedly, one of the biggest obstacles to a layman's complete 
understanding of the legal aspects of education is his unfamiliarity 
with the legal terms used by the courts and the legal profession. In 
order to help·eliminate some of the difficulties, the following defi-
nitions are given for the legalterms used most frequently in this 
study. The definitions, other·than Judicial Citations, are taken from 
Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition.3 
Appellant. The party who takes an appeal from one court or juris-
diction to another. 
Appellate Court. A court having jurisdiction of appeal and review; 
a reviewing court, and, except in special cases where original juris-
diction is conferred,·not a "trial court" or court of first instance. 
• .Appellee. The party in a cause against whom an appeal is taken; 
· that is, · the party who has an interest adverse to setting aside or re-
versing the judgment. Sometimes also called the 11 respondent. 11 
Case. A general term for an action, cause, suit, or controversy, 
at law or in equity; a question contested before a. court of justice; 
an aggregate of facts which furnishes occasion for'the exercise of the 
jurisdiction of a·court of justice. 
3Henry Campbell Black, Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, 
(St. Paul, 1951). 
Case Law. The aggregate of reported cases as forming a body of 
jurisprudence, or the law of a particular subject as evidenced or formed 
by the adjudged cases, in distinction to statutes and other sources of 
law. 
Common Lawo As distinguished from law created by the enactment of 
legislatures, the common law comprises the body of those principles and 
rules of action, relating to the government and security of persons and 
property, which derive their authority solely from usages and customs of 
immemorial antiquity, or from the judgments and decrees of the courts 
recognizing, affirming, and enforcing such usages and customs. 
Domicile. That place where a man has his true, fixed, and perma'-
nent home and principal establishment, and to which whenever he is ab-
sent he has the intention of returning; not for a mere special or 
temporary purpose, but with the present intention of making a permanent 
home, for an unlimited or indefinite period. 
Interpretation. The art or process of discovering and expounding 
the meaning of a statute, will, contract, or other written document. 
Judicial Citations. References to court decisions. Citations in 
this study refer to official state reports and to the National Reporter 
System. 
·Jurisdiction. The word is a term of ·large and comprehensive im-
port, and embraces every kind of judicial action. It is the authority 
by which courts and judicial officers take cognizance of and decide 
cases. 
Lawsuit. A vernacular term for a suit, action, or cause instituted 
or pendi:ng between two private persons in the courts of law. An action 
or proceeding in a civil court. 
Litigant. A party to a lawsuit; one engaged in litigation. 
Litigate. To dispute or contend in form of law; to carry on a 
suit. 
Litigation. Contest in a court of justice for the purpose of e~-
forcing a right. 
Mandamus. This is the name of a writ (formerly a high prerogative 
writ) which issues from a court of superior jurisdiction, and is di-
rected to a private or municipal corporation, or any of its officers., 
or to an executive, administrative or judicial officer, or to an i:r1fe-
rior court, commanding the performance of a particular act therein 
specified, and belonging to his or their public, official, or miDis-
terial duty, or directing the restoration of the c~nplainant to rights 
or privileges of which he has been illegally deprived. 
Residence. A factual place of abode. Living in a particular lo-
cality--it requires only bodily presence as an inhabitant of a place. 
"Residence means living in a particular locality, but domicile means 
living in that locality with intent to make it a fixed and permanent 
home. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in 
a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place 
and also an intention to make it one's domicile. 11 
Resident. One who has his residence in a place. 
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Statute. An act of the legislature declaring, corrrrnanding, or pro-
hibiting something; a particular law enacted and established by the will 
of the legislative department of government; the written will of the 
legislature, solemnly expressed according to the forms necessary to con-
stitute it the law of the state. This word is used to designate the 
written law in contradistinction to the unwritten law. 
Ultra Vires. The modern technical designation, ••• of acts beyond 
the scope of the powers •••• 
In the writer 1 s opinion, an understanding of the definitions above 
will enable a reader of this study to read with clarity and perception 
the material presented pertaining to the cases, opinions, and rulings. 
"When possible, the writer will refrain from using legal terms, but will 
employ terminology generally used by persons not associated with the 
legal profession. 
CHAPTER II 
PUPIL ADMISSION AND ATTENDANCE 
Education is a concern of all the people. The Federal Constitu-
tion, by implication, left the control of public schools to the states. 
Each state, by acts of its legislature, has enacted legislation estab-
lishing a system of education with the structural patterns and modes of 
its operation. Since education in the American form of government is 
essentially a function of the states, the courts of many states have 
been asked to clarify the function of the public school in organized 
society. 
Right to Attend School. School attendance, according to Edwards, 
11 ••• is a privilege which the state confers upon its youth; the only 
right a child has to school attendance is the right which the state con-
fers upon all other children similarly situated. 111 Garber and Edwards 
write that, "School attendance is a privilege extended by the state and 
not an absolute right •••• 11 2 
In emphasizing the nature of public education Marke states: 
Admission to the public schools ••• is not a privilege or im-
munity belonging as a matter of right to a person just because 
lNewton Edwards, The Courts and the Public Schools (Chicago, 1955), 
p. 540. 
2Lee O. Garber and Newton Edwards,~ Law Governing Pupils 
(Danville, Ill., 1962), p. 5. 
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he is a citizen of the United States. It is not a federal 
constitutional right. Nor is it a natural right •••• The 
privilege of receiving an education at the state's expense 
may be granted or refused to any individual or class at the 
pleasure of the state.3 
11 
Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. '1.:l., Section 445, at page 349, clearly 
defines the nature of the "right" to attend public schools as: 
The right to attend a public school and receive instruction 
therein is not a private right held by an individual sepa-
rately from the community at large, but is a civil right or 
political privilege held in common with all others of the 
same community. 
To explain further this privilege, it continues, "The privilege, how-
ever, does not appertain to a citizen of the United States as such, and 
therefore cannot be demanded on the mere status of citizenship." 
The courts have clearly ruled that the public school is a creature 
of the state, that attendance at school is a privilege, and the "right" 
to attend an educational institution at public expense is not a natural 
right. Perhaps the case which most clearly expresses the attitude of 
the courts is one that was decided in 1912 in which it was stated: 
The primary purpose of the maintenance of the common school 
system is promotion of the general intelligence of the people 
constituting the body politic and thereby to increase the 
usefulness and efficiency of the citizens, upon which the 
government of society depends. Free schooling furnished 
by the state is not so much a right granted to pupils as 
a duty imposed upon them for the public good. If they do 
not voluntarily attend the schools provided for them, they 
may be compelled to do so. 
While most people regard the public schools as the 
means of great personal advantage to the pupils, the fact 
is too often overlooked that they are governmental means 
of protecting the state from the consequences of an igno-
rant and incompetent citizenship. The controlling inter-
est of the state is the development of a citizenry intelli-
gent enough to maintain our democratic form of government.4 
3David Taylor Marke, Educational Law (New York, 1949), p . 11. 
4E.Qgg_ v. Board of Education, 76 N.H. 296, 82 Atl. 173-174. 
In a case brought before the courts in the State of Florida in 
1945, the presiding judge stated that "The right to attend an educa-
tional institution provided by the state is not a natural right but a 
public benefaction •••• 11 5 
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From the preceding paragraphs it can be stated that: (1) the public 
school is a state institution; (2) the "right" to attend the public 
school is a political privilege; (3) the privilege to attend the public 
school is bestowed upon all children of all the people; (4) the privi-
lege may be granted or refused to any individual or class at the pleas-
ure of the state; and (5) the privilege is not available to a person by 
the mere fact that he is a citizen of the United States. 
Residence As~ Factor for Admission. It has been established.that 
admission and attendance in the public schools is basically a political 
privilege extended by the state for the welfare of society. The demo-
cratic form of governm.ent·depends on an educated public. Inasmuch as 
attendance in schools at public expense is not a private right guaran-
teed by the Federal Constitution, but is a privilege established by the 
state, regulations for·school attendance are determined by the state 
legislatures. Those who desire to reap ~he benefits of the public 
school system must submit to the conditions imposed. 
Rermnlein emphasizes the point very well when she writes: 
Constitutional mandates requiring state legislatures to es-
t.ablish and maintain free public · schools do not mean neces-
sarily that all persons who wish may attend free of .charge. 
5Satan Fraternity v. Board of Public Instruction, 156 Fla. 222, 22 
So. (2d) S92. 
The legislature may set standards to be met as a qualifi-
cation for free attendance.6 
Edwards, in his discussion of pupil admission and attendance, 
writes, 11 ••• attendance at the state schools is essentially a privilege 
and not a right, the state may authorize its agents to exclude all chil-
dren who do not meet the requirements established by the state. 11 7 Al-
though the state is vested with the authority and power to establish and 
regulate its public school system, there are certain constitutional 
rights and privileges granted to the individual by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Federal Constitution. However, this amendment is not all 
inclusive. 
A factor of major importance in determining the eligibility of a 
pupil for education at public expense is the residence requirement. 
Many cases have come before the courts to question the right of the leg-
islature or ·the local boards of education in establishing particular 
residence requirements. As a general rule the free school privileges of 
a district, town, or city are available only to children, otherwise eli-
gible, who are bona fide residents of the state., city, town, or school 
district. Litigation arises over the interpretation of what constitutes 
residence for free school privileges. 
While the right of pupils to rece:ive the benefit of free education 
in a particular district depends upon the wording of the statute, ac-
cording to Hamilton and Mort: 
••• it is usually provided that they may attend the schools 
of the district in which they reside without the payment of 
6:Madaline K. Rernrriiein, School Law (Danville, Ill.., 1962), p. 195. 
7Edwards, p. 540. 
tuition •••• pupils are restricted to attendance at schools 
in the district in which they·reside unless provision is 
made by statute whereby they may attend elsewhere.8 
However, what constitutes residence for school purposes in ma~..y 
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cases is not easy to determine, and the problem has been brotight befQre 
the cou~s frequently. It is often difficult to determine what consti-
tutes residence within the meaning of the statutes. Much depends upon 
the wording of the statutes in each particular case. The courts, in 
their interpretation of statutes governing the right of pupils to attend 
a particular school, agree that the domicile of the child is the do:mi-:·_ 
cile of the parents. However, in :construing statutes dealing with the 
right of children to attend school, the co~s have generally held that 
the residence requirement entitling a pupil to free public school privi-
leges is distinguished from domicile. 
In Turner ·2.i al. v. City Board of Education .Qf the City of May-
field, Kentucky, it was ruled: 
Every child of school age has the privilege of attending 
the public school in the district in which he lives. This 
does not mean legal domicile in the technical and narrow 
sense of residence of a person for purpose of taxation or 
suffrage.9 
However, it is defined as, 11 ••• the place where the child is an inhabit-
ant or ·where he lives in fact •••• 1110 
The Supreme Court of Colorado in 1943 in a suit brought in behalf 
of an eight-year-old child who,, since birth, resided with an uncle in 
8Hamilton and Mort, p. 508. 
9Turner·et al. v. CJty Board of Education of City of Mayfield, 
313 Ky. 383, 231 S.W. (2d 27. 
10Toid. 
Denver, explained the interpretation·of the residence requirements as 
follows: 
The terms dondcile and residence ••• are not synonymous ••• in 
statute setting forth residence requirements entitling chil-
dren to school privileges •••• residence entitling an infant 
to school privileges is.distinguished from dondcile or·the 
technical and narrow use of the term 11 residencei 11 for ·the 
purpose of suffrage or·other·like purposes •••• l 
This court indicated that residence requirements for school pu~-
poses are, 
••• construed in the liberal sense as meaning to live in, 
or be an inhabitant of, a school district, the purpose 
being not to debar from school privileges any 'child of 
school age found within the school district under·the care, 
custody or control of a resident thereof.12 · 
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In a ruling brought before the Supreme Court of Oregon in .1964, it 
was ruled that inasmuch as the statute concerning education had as an 
intent on the part of the State of Oregon to provide free education for 
all children within the borders of the state, the residence requirement 
was considered in a different sense than dondcile for purposes of suf-
frage. This court stated that for school purposes, 
••• the term "residence" signifies the place where a child 
lives with some degree of permanency. There is no require-
ment of legal domicile; it is sufficient if the child lives 
with his parents or some person in loco parentis within the 
district .13 . 
In a great majority of cases, the courts have ruled.that in order 
·to qualify for ·the privilElge of school attendance without .the payment of 
llcline v. Knight et al., lll Colo. 8, 137 P. (2d) 680, 146 A.L.R. 
1281. 
12Ibid. 
13school District No. 16-R Umatilla County v. McCormmach, Sup. Ct. 
Oregon, 392 P. (2d) 101~ 
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tuition, it is not necessary that a child establish a legal domicile in 
the district. It has generally been held that 11 residence11 as applied to 
school privileges is used in its broadest sense. The general rule is 
that the legal residence of a child is that of his father except in 
cases such as the death of the father, the separation of the parents 
with the mother receiving custody of the child, or where t he child is 
placed in the legal custody of other persons. 
Litigation quite frequently has arisen in circumstances in which a 
child moves into a district for the purpose of taking advantage of 
school privileges, with the father or legal guardian maintaining his 
legal residence outside the district. A case decided by the Supreme 
Court of Oklahoma in 1964 dealt with this particular point of law. In 
the case of Gray v. Board of Education of Pawhuska Independent School 
District, 389 P. (2d) 498, it was ruled that although the children some-
times spent the night in t he home of their grandfather, and the grand-
f ather spent several hundred dollars for clothing and had furnished 
lunch money for the children, the children were not entitled t o school 
privileges in a district other than the district in which they had a 
legal residence. The opinion of the court states: 
••• the legislature intended that where t he parents of minor 
children residing in the family home have their legal care 
and custody, and contribute to their support in a substantial 
or major degree, the school residence of the children is the 
same as the residence of the parents. 
Another case pertaining to the point of law of a person moving into 
the district for the express purpose of sending his children t o the 
school of that district was decided by the Supreme Court of Indiana in 
1948. The case involved residents of a farm outside the t own in which 
the parent operated a business concern for many years . The farm was 
17 
also located outside the school district serving the town. In an at-
tempt to obtain school privileges for their children, the family rented 
a room in the town, ate their meals in the father's restaurant, and the 
parents signed a declaration that they considered themselves as legal 
residents of the town. The judges ruled: 
The declaration of intention to become a resident of Walkerton 
••• was somewhat self-serving. While there was some change 
in the living conditions of the family, it cannot be said 
••• that he ••• lost his domicile in Marshall County and ac-
quired one in St. Joseph County.14 
The court ruled that the children were not eligible to attend the school 
outside the district of the parents' legal residence without the payment 
of a tuition charge. 
Generally, it is agreed that a parent going temporarily into a dis-
trict to reside during the scholastic year for the purpose of free 
school privileges for his children is not a bona fide resident of the 
district, and his children are not entitled to the school privileges of 
the district without payment of tuition. 
A still valid opinion handed down in 1897 presents in clear , con-
cise terms the general rule held by the courts. The opinion in part 
reads: 
••• where a child of school age is sent or goes into a certain 
school district with the primary purpose of securing a home 
with a particular family, then he is entitled to the benefits 
of the public school of such district free of charge. 
The opinion continues, 
••• but, if the primary purpose of the locating in such dis-
trict is to participate in the advantages which the public 
14state ex rel. Flaugher v. Rogers, 226 Ind. 32, 77 N.E. (2d) 594. 
schools therein afford, then he must pay tuition, even t hough 
there be some other incidental purpose to be subserved while 
so attending school therein.15 
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It may be stated, then, that residence for school purposes is con-
sidered in a broader sense than domicile required for such purposes as 
voting. A dwelling, more or less permanent, establishes the right to 
attend the public schools of the district free of tuition. Even a resi-
dence which is temporary fulfills the requirements if the reason for the 
temporary residence is not primarily that the child may attend a partic-
ular school. The test depends on whether the residence is established 
primarily for school purposes, and whether removal is planned as soon as 
the benefits of the school facilities have been obtained. 
Section 152.5 of Supplement to American Jurisprudence, Vol. lll., at 
page 50, lends support to the conclusions stated above in the following 
comment: 
It is not indispensable that school children should have a 
legal domicil in the district in which they claim school 
privileges if they actually reside in such district with 
no present purpose of removal and are under the control of 
one who fulfils the minimum requirements of being in loco 
parentis. 
Residents of Charitable Institutions, Foster Homes, and Orphanages. 
A cause for frequent litigation on the issue of residence has occurred 
when children live in a foster home, a charitable institution, an or-
phanage, or other similar arrangement. The courts are not in complete 
agreement with respect to the rights of children who are inmates of a 
charitable institution or an institution whose primary purpose is t o 
15state ex rel. Smith v. Board of Education of the City of Eau 
Claire, 96 Wis. 95, 71 N.W. 123. 
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provide for foster or neglected children. Conflict has arisen as to 
whether the children are to .be considered for school purposes as resi-
dents of the district in·which the institution is located. 
According to Edwards: 
In some states, notably Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and 
Vermont, it has been held that inmates of such institutions 
are residents of the district in which they have their legal 
domicile, that is, the domicile of their parents, or last 
surviving parent.16 
A case decided in 1944 by the Ohio Supreme Courtl7 supports this 
opinion. The question brought before the courts in the case concerns 
the rights of children, formerly residents of the Cleveland, Ohio, dis-
trict, who were committed to a child-placing agency by the juvenile 
court. The agency in turn placed the children in board:L~g homes in the 
City of Parma. Whether ·the children were residents, for school pur-
poses, of the Cleveland or of the Parma School District was the specific 
question involved. The court .ruled that where the children resided in 
Cleveland prior to their commitment and later were placed in homes in 
.the City of Parma, the children remained residents, for school privi-
leges, of Cleveland. 
In states where the courts rule in this manner, the child living i~ 
a charitable institution, foster home, or an orphanage does not have the 
right to attend the public schools of the district free.of charge. His 
tuition, if he attends the public school, must be paid by the district 
in which he has his domicile or by the institution or home. Some 
16Edwards, p. 530. 
17state ex rel. Gibbs et al. v. Martin et al., 143 Ohio St. 491, 
56 N.E. (2d) 14$-. -
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authorities contend that inasmuch as many of the charitable institutions 
do not pay a school tax that the mere fact of residence in such i nstitu-
tion is not sufficient to entitle the child to free public school advan-
tages. 
In a great majority of cases brought before the courts, however, it 
has been contended that the child who is an inmate of the charitable in-
stitution or an orphanage has the privilege of attending the public 
schools of the district in which the institution or orphanage is located 
without the payment of tuition. 
The inmates of a nonprofit, benevolent, charitable, and unincorpo-
rated children's home in the State of Kansas were entitled, according to 
a 1947 Kansas Supreme Court ruling, to attend school in the district in 
which the home was located without the payment of tuition. The court in 
its opinion stated: 
We feel confident ••• that the children in its (children's 
home) care are residents of the school district in which 
the home is situated and are entitled to attend school in 
that district without the payment of tuition.18 
An opinion in 1939 by the Supreme Court of Minnesota explained in 
greater detail the reasoning for ·their interpretati on of this point of 
law. This opinion stated in part that: 
••• the home is a place of their dwelling indefinitely •••• 
they have no other place, at least for the present, where 
the care and support demanded by the law can be bestowed. 
The fact that someone may adopt a child or that his parents 
may be able again to undertake their duties does not render 
the children merely sojourners. It is at the home where 
they in fact live and receive what more fortunate minors are 
given at their parents' home. A residence within the dis-
trict is sufficiently established, and the children of t he 
18Mariadahl Children's Home v. Bellegarde School District No • .?l, 
163 Kans. 49, 180 P. (2d) 61~ 
home must be admitted to the district school on the same 
basis as other children in ·the district.19 
It has been ruled that orphan children committed to .the care and 
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custody of residents of a school district are entitled.to free schooling 
privilE;Jges in that district~ Such was the ruling in Wirth et al. v. 
Board of Education for Jefferson County et al., 262 Ky. 291, 90 s.w. 
(2d) 62, (1935). In this case Dewey Wirth, a minor, was placed in a 
foster home by a children's home, with ·the children's home maintaining 
its jurisdiction over the child. Mr. Heady, in whose home Dewey was 
assigned, filed suit against the board of education in the district in 
which his home was situated, requesting that the Wirth child be per-
mitted to attend the local public schools without the paying of tuition 
charges. The case was decided in favor of Wirth when the judges con-
eluded: 
We are convinced ••• for common school purposes so long as 
he remains at Heady 1s home, Wirth is a resident of the com-
mon school district in which Heady resides, and he is en-
titled to attend, free of tuition, the common schools taught 
therein. 
Another suit involving the rights to .attend school free of tuition 
by children placed in a foster home was decided by the New York Supreme 
Court in 1962. The facts of the New York case were somewhat similar to 
those in the case cited above; however, the foster parents in the New 
19state ex rel. Board of Christian Service of Lutheran Minnesota 
Conference v.""""school Board of Consolidated Schooi""°District No. J., 206 
Minn. 63, 287 N.W. 625. other cases investigated and analyzed holding 
similar opinions are: Salem Independent School District v. ~, 206 
Iowa 967, 221 N.W. 519 (1928); State~ rel. Johnson v. Cotton, 67 S.D. 
63, 289 N.W. 71, (1939); Dean et al. v. Board of Education of School 
District No. !22 et .§!:1., 386 Ill. 156, 53 N.E. (2d) 875, (1944); City of 
New Haven v. Town of Torrington, 132 Conn. 194, 43 A. (2d) 455, (1945); 
and Jefferson Countt Board of Education·et al. v. Goheen, 306 Ky. 439, 
207 s.w. (2d) 567, 1947). - .- -
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York case moved to the City of New Rochelle from New York City after the 
foster children were assigned to their home by the Children's Court. 
The Supreme Court of New York ruled that where children adjudicated neg-
lected and committed to the care of the City Welfare Commissioner and 
then placed in a foster home of a family residing in the city and sub-
sequently moved to another city, the assigned .children become residents 
of second city for educational purposes and are entitled to free matric-
ulation in the public schools.20 
From the cases coming before the courts of record in recent years, 
it has generally been held that an orphan or child who has no home other 
than the orphanage or institution to which he is committed, so long as 
the child remains in the home and the home or institution stands in loco 
parentis to the child, is a resident of the school district in which the 
home is located, and is entitled to the public school privileges. Un-
less state statutes hold otherwise, an orphan committed to the custody 
and care of an individual is entitled to public school privileges with-
out the payment of tuition in the district where, after the corrnnitment, 
he lives. 
Rights of Pupils Residing on Federally Owned or Controlled Prop-
erty. Another factor related to the issue of residence for school at-
tendance purposes in which litigation has frequently arisen pertains to 
the rights and privileges of pupils living on federally owned or fed-
erally controlled property. It has been held that pupils residing in 
territory which is under the exclusive jurisdiction and supervision of 
20Dumpson v. Board of Education of City of New Rochelle, 17 A.D. 
(2d) 634, 230 N.Y.S. (2d) 515. 
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the United States Government do not have the right to attend the public 
schools of the conununity without the payment of tuition charges. The 
state, according to authorities, has no responsibility for public serv-
ice including public education for areas under ·the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the Federal Government. 
An opinion handed down by the Justices of the Supreme Court of 
Massachusetts in 1841 clearly states the relationship of the state t o 
such areas as follows: 
••• persons who reside on lands purchased by or ceded to the 
United States for navy yards, forts and arsenals, and where 
there is no other reservation of jurisdiction to the state 
and that of a right to serve civil and criminal process on 
such lands, are not entitled to the benefits of the conunon 
schools for their children in the towns in which the lands 
are situated--nor are they liable to be assessed for their 
polls and estates to state, county, and town t axes, in such 
towns--nor do they gain a settlement in such towns, for 
themselves or their children, by residence for any length 
of time on such lands--nor do they acquire, by residing on 
such l ands, any elective franchise as inhabitants of such 
towns.21 
This opinion has not been overruled. It was, in fact, considered t o be 
a good law by an "Advisory Conunittee on Education" which was appointed 
by the President of the United St ates in 1939. 
The Court of Appeals of Ohio in 1944 referred t o t he Massachusetts 
opinion when it denied a writ of mandamus t o compel the Board of Edu-
cation of Euclid City School District to admit t o its s chools pupils 
living in housing projects which were owned by the Federal Government 
and which were within the school district. The Ohio Court stated in 
part : 
The jurisdiction exercised by the United States Government 
over this project (defense housing) is no different from 
210pinion of the Justices, 42 Mass. 580 . 
what its jurisdiction would be if the land had been acquired 
for a fort or an arsenal ••• the board of education is lU1der 
no obligation to admit children living in these housing pro- · 
jects to the public schools without the payment of tuition •••• 22 
In expounding on the reasoning used in this Ohio case, the court 
explained that: 
If the children residing in these projects are entitled to 
schooling without the payment of any tuition or any payment 
by FPHA (Federal Projects Housing Administration), the burden 
that may be cast on the shoulders of the taxpayers of t he 
City of Euclid may become so 11undue and insupportable11 as 
to seriously lower, if not destroy, the effectiveness of 
its public school system.23 
A writ of mandamus to compel the O'Hara Township School District to 
admit pupils living on the grounds of the Veterans' Administration Hos-
pital free of charge to the O'Hara Schools was refused in the l ower 
courts, and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld the judgment. In 
their ruling the Justices stated, 11To be a resident of a particular po-
litical subdivision of a state, a person must reside on land over ·which 
the state has jurisdiction. It has long been held, 11 they continue, 
11that persons living on federal reservations are not residents of the 
state wherein such reservations are situated. 11 24 
In explaining the policy of the Federal Government in relation t o 
the question of local school districts educating pupils who are living 
on federally controlled l ands, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded: 
No intent on the part of Congress t o impose upon local school 
districts the cost of public ' education for the children of 
22st ate ~rel.Moore et al . v. Board of Education of Euclid City 
School District, Ct. App. Ohio, 57 N.E. (2d)ll8 .• 
23Toid. 
24s chwartz v. O'Hara Township School District et al ., 375 Pa . 440 , 
100 A. (2d) 621. 
residents of federal areas, lying within such districts ••• to 
burden them (local community) with the duty of furnishing 
free educational facilities for the children resident on such 
federal areas would be as oppressive as it would be u...ri~air.25 
The point of law ruled on in .the preceding case was upheld by the 
Supreme Court of South Dakota. In cases brought before the court in 
1923 and again in 1925, the question of the rights of children whose 
parents were residents of federal Indian school lands to attend local 
25 
public schools free of charge was litigated. 11We are forced to the con-
clusion., 11 wrote the Justices in the 1923 case, 
••• that the lands on which the parents of the children in 
question reside, while within the territorial boundaries of 
the appellant district., form no part of such district. Con-
sequently., the parents are not residents of such district •••• 26 
Two years later the South Dakota Supreme Court again ruled that, 
11Residence upon this ceded Indian school land does not of itself consti-
tute the parents residents of School District No. 20, nor of Pe~.nington 
County., nor of the State of South Dakota." They continue, 11 ••• of course 
if the parents came to reside on this federal land from another state, 
they have not acquired residence and citizenship.in this state. 11 27 
There seems to be general agreement that pupils living on property 
which is under exclusive jurisdiction of the United States Government 
are not entitled to attend free the schools of the corrnnunity. To pre-
vent development of an uneducated segment of the American population, to 
prevent the placing of the burden of tuition charges on the parents of 
25Ibid. 
26school District No. 20 of Pennington County v. Steele et al., 46 
S.D. 589., 195 N.W. 448. 
27Rockwell v. Independent School District of Rapid City et al., L+,8 
S.D. 137, 202 N.W. 478. 
26 
children living on federally controlled property, and to continue the 
principle that each child has a right to a free education, the Federal 
Government at an early date had an awareness of the responsibility f or 
the education of these children. The "Advisory Committee on Education, 11 
referred to earlier in this chapter, in one of its reports stated: 
••• definite obligation rests upon the Federal Government f or 
the education of children residing on those reservations which 
are under exclusive federal jurisdiction. By some means or 
other the Federal Government should recognize its responsi-
bility for the free education of these children and make pro-
visions for discharging it. 
The Federal Government may acquire the use of land for some federal 
purposes without acquiring exclusive jurisdiction. Such purposes as low 
cost housing projects, farmstead projects, and slum clearance projects 
are examples of acquisition of land by the Federal Government without 
obtaining complete jurisdiction over the lands. 
According to two decisions from the Supreme Court of Nebraska in 
1937, where parents of school age children occupied lands in a federally 
sponsored farmstead project and were residents of the school district in 
which the lands were located, the children were entitled t o free public 
school privileges. The following opinion, taken from Tagge et al. v. 
Gulzow et al., 132 Neb. 276, 271 N.W. 803, is representative of reason-
ing by the Justices, "For the purposes of civil and criminal jurisdic-
tion and of political rights, the state has not lost its jurisdiction 
over the farmsteads and the occupants thereof." For school purposes 
they state, 11The status ••• as residents is the same as that of others i !l 
the school district ••• their children of school age are entitled t o com-
mon school privileges without payment of tuition. 11 
In an Ohio case in 1945, the court refused t o issue an injunction 
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restraining and enjoining the Cleveland Board of Education from per-
mitting free educational service to be furnished t o children residing on 
land owned by the United States. The land in question was utilized by 
the United States in conjunction with the State of Ohio for housing war 
workers and for carrying on slum clearance projects. In summary, the 
court expressed its opinion thusly: 
The Court finds nothing in the record which would raise any 
question that the persons domiciled upon these projects are 
not "residents" or "actual residents" thereof ••• under any 
definition of these words in any authority cited •••• their 
status now is exactly the same as that of all other children 
resident in the district, and they are entitled t o the same 
privileges of a free education.28 
From the opinions of cases cited and discussed on the question of 
rights for school attendance of persons residing on federal property, it 
is found that free admission to a district school may not be claimed by 
children residing on l and purchased or ceded t o the United States if the 
Federal Government obtains exclusive jurisdiction of said lands . How-
ever, in cases where the acquisition of lands by the United St ates does 
not result in an ouster of state jurisdiction and loss of control, the 
children residing on these l ands are considered residents for school 
purposes and are entitled t o the privilege of free public education just 
as any other resident children. 
Rights to Admission of Nonresidents. Generally, in t he absence of 
statutory provisions to the contrary, children of parents who are not 
residents of a school district are not eligible to receive the privi-
leges of free school attendance in such district . Rerrunlein states, 
28McGwinn et al. v. Board of Education of Cleveland City School 
District et al., 147 Ohio St. 259, 69 N.E. (2d) 391, appeal dismissed 
70 N.E. (2d) 776. 
28 
11Attendance is not free to nonresidents •••• 11 29 In discussing the point 
further she continues, " ••• generally speaking, tuition is paid in order 
that children may attend a school outside their resident district. 1130 
The Supreme Court of Colorado in 1932 stated in its opinion that, 11 Gen-
erally, children whose parents are not residents of school district are 
not permitted to attend school therein. 1131 
In a case appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court in 1963, this 
same point of law was questioned and the court ruled as follows: urn 
the absence of a statute authorizing the admission of nonresident stu-
dents, it is generally held that children have no right to be admitted 
to a school outside of their own district on any terms •••• 1132 The opin-
ion of the judges in discussing the point also stated, 11 ••• a school 
district has no authority to open its schools on any terms for the in-
struction of children living outside of the district in which such 
schools are located. 11 33 The ori..ly right of a pupil to attend a school 
outside the district in which he resides then is purely statutory and 
must be fou..11.d in the laws enacted by the state legislature. Likewise, 
the only right of a district to admit nonresident pupils must be fOlmd 
in legislative authority. It has been ruled by the courts that public 
schools of the state are under control of the legislature and !! ••• that 
29Madaline K. Rennnlein, School Law (Danville, Ill., 1962), p. 196. 
30Ibid. 
31Fangman et al. v. Moyers, 8 P. (2d) 762. 
32Myhre et al. v. School Board of North Central Public School Dis-
trict No. 10, Richland Gou..11.ty, Sup. Ct. N.D., 122 N.W. (2d) 816. 
33Toid. 
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a school board has no powers except those conferred by statute; t hat 
school boards may exercise only such powers as are expressly or im-
pliedly granted by statute •••• 1134 
Circumstances frequently are such that one school district is 
liable for tuition charges of children sent to another district. An 
opinion from the Supreme Court of Minnesota in 1957 stated this clearly 
when it said, "It is well established that the legislature may require 
payment of a per pupil charge from the district in which a pupil re-
sides to the district accepting such children for education. 1135 Al-
though the legislatures are responsible for ·the establishment and 
maintenance of a uniform system of free public schools, this requirement 
does not contemplate that facilities in any district supported by taxes 
imposed upon its taxpayers are to be available to students from other 
districts without tuition. In the Minnesota case cited earlier, the 
judges explained this reasoning most effectively when explaining why the 
school board of each district should be permitted t o use its discretion 
in refusing admittance of nonresidents. Their explanation, in part, was 
as follows: 
•• • a school district would have t o accept children from any 
other school district in the state. In the efficient oper-
ation of schools, the actual day-to-day cost is only one of 
the factors with which the school board must contend. The 
Board must know also, within at least approximate limits, 
what its present and future school population will be . It 
must gear its present and future physical plant and persoILnel 
to such ascertainable school population. It must also know, 
within reasonabl e limit s , what its tax base is going to be . 
There are many other similar factors which are of equal im-
portance, none of which could be ascertained or even estimated 
34Ibid. 
35Melby v. Hellie et al., 249 Minn. 17, 80 N.W. (2d) 849 . 
if it were compelled to accept children from any and all 
other school districts desiring to send children there.36 
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Agreeing with this opinion was an opinion given by the Utah Supreme 
Court in 1938 which stated that: 
Since each district is charged with the duty of providing 
adequate school facilities for the children resident in that 
district, in order that such children may not be deprived 
of school privileges by overcrowding of rooms, or too large 
attendance for the book or laboratory facilities, or im-
posing too many students on a teacher for efficient work, 
the district must have the privilege of barring nonresident 
students whose home district provides for them proper edu-
cational advantages.37 
The statutes in many states provide that, under some conditions, 
pupils residing in one school district may attend school in another dis-
trict. Generally, such statutes apply to pupils residing in districts 
not maintaining all grades in their public schools or to pupils who can 
be accommodated more conveniently in another district. In a case before 
the Supreme Court of Wyoming, it was held that students before com-
pleting grades offered by their home school district were not eligible 
to attend school in a neighboring district at the expense of the home 
school district. The judges in this 1933 case said: 
As it appears as a fact from this record that Billy Magoon 
and Virginia Robinson had not completed the course of study 
offered by District No. 12 at the time they entered the high 
school of District No. 1, the former may not be held liable 
to the latter ·for ·their tuition under the statute upon whi ch 
reliance is here placed •••• 38 
The right of a school district to admit nonresident pupils from 
36Ibid. 
37Logan City School District v. Kowallis et al., 94 Utah 342, 77 P. 
(2d) 348. 
38state ~rel.School District No. 1 Niobrara County v. Sc~ool 
District No. 12 Niobrara County et al., 45 Wyo. 365, 18 P. (2d) 1010 . 
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organized school districts within the State of North Dakota is limited 
to instances in which the school district of the pupils' residence con-
sents or in which attendance is based on reasons of convenience. The 
reasons of convenience are subject to the approval of the Co1.1i."'lty Judge, 
the State Attorney, and the County Superintendent of Schools. 
In litigation before the court in 1963, the Supreme Court Justices 
ruled that: 
Our statutes now specifically provide that admission of non-
resident pupils ••• is limited to those cases where such attend-
ance is consented to by the school district of the pupils' 
residence, or·where attendance of such·nonresident pupils is 
based on reasons of convenience.39. 
According to the ruling of this court, the school district.did not have 
discretion to admit the children and determine the amou.,."'lt of tuition to 
be charged parents of such nonresident children. They amphasized that, 
Before such nonresident students may be admitted ••• home dis-
trict must .give its approval or ·the three member committee 
must find ••• that the attendance of the ••• students •.•• is neces-
sitated by shorte,r distance or by· other reasons of convenience,.40 
The Texas c'ourt in 1956 had a case brought .before it concerning the 
right of a school board to voltmtarily admit and teach nonresident stu-
dents who were not formally transferred without charging tuition to the 
nonresident children's parents or school district. The following state-
ments taken from the opinion explain the reasoning used by the judges: 
••• the East Mountain School Board would have the discretion-
ary authority to voluntarily admit and teach nonresident scho-
lastics ( ••• not formally transferred ••• ) ••• as long as the 
admission and teaching of such nonre.sident s,tudents would 
39Myhre et .al. v. School Board of North Central Public School Dis-
trict No. 10, Richland County, Sup. Ct. N.D., 122 N.W. (2d) ~ -
40Toid. 
3? _, 
not be prejudicial or detrimental to the free school pupils 
of the East Mountain District.41 
Connnenting further·on.their ruling that the East Mountain District 
Trustees had discretionary authority to voluntarily receive and teach 
the nonresident pupils free of charge, the judges stated that, "Ordin-
arily, of course, the trustees of a school district would probably 
charge tuition to nonresident scholastics not formally transferred and 
not entitled to free tuition at their school. 1142 It was also expressed 
in the opinion that.when the parents of the nonresident pupils made 
their own arrangements with the school trustees of another ·school dis-
trict to admit their children that this would be no different from their 
making arrangements with a private school to teach them. Therefore, it 
was concluded that the parents could not be successfully prosecuted for 
any crime on their part. 
From the cases cited and discussed in the preceding paragraphs, it 
is found that nonresident children are not entitled, generally, to the 
privileges of free public schools; tuition is paid in order for non-
resident children to attend a school outside their resident district; 
resident district normally pays tuition for children to attend school 
outside their district, if home district.does not have available proper 
facilities and grades; when a parent arranges for his children to attend 
school outside his resident district, especially if ·school privileges 
are furnished by the home district, the parent is liable for ·the tuition 
·charges. 
4lpaJ.mer et al. v. District Trustees of District No. 21, Ct. of 
Civil App. Texas,~89 s.w. (2d) 344. 
42J:bid. 
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Age As~ Factor for Admission. It has been stated that the public 
school is a state institution and the privilege to attend the public 
school may be granted or refused to any individual or class at the plea-
sure of the state. The privilege for free attendance is not available 
to a person by the fact that he is a citizen of the United States. Reg-
ulations for school attendance are determined by the state legislatures, 
and persons desiring to reap the benefits of the free public schools 
must submit to these regulations. Residence requirements which must be 
satisfied in order for a person to be eligible for free public school 
privileges were discussed in the earlier sections of this chapter. 
Another condition which is imposed on potential recipients of pub-
lic school privileges is the age requirement. Generally, if a person 
has attained the age of six years, is below the age of twenty-one years 
and meets the other requirements, he is entitled to free public school 
attendance. The legislatures have usually established the specified age 
groups which may be allowed free attendance at the public schools. It 
is generally agreed that a state legislature may enact such legislation 
unless it is prohibited by the State or Federal Constitution. Litiga-
tion in the area of age requirements most often before the courts per-
tains to the question as to when a child may enter the first grade if he 
reaches the prescribed minimum. age after the opening of the school year. 
Some states have statutes covering this point. It usually, however, 
falls within the discretion of the local boards of education. States 
with laws pertaining to age requirements usually establish a 11 cut-off11 
date for children entering school for the first time. The right of the 
state legislature to enact legislation of this type has gone practically 
unchallenged. In those states where such legislation exists~ the local 
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boards of education must comply with these provisions; they have no dis-
cretion in the matter of entrance age or "cut-off" dates for admission. 
In states which do not have legislation pertaining to entrance age 
requirements, it has been ruled that the local boards of education may 
establish "cut-off" dates for persons entering school for the first 
time. An example of such a ruling comes from litigation before the 
Supreme Court of Montana in 1960 in which the appellee had filed f or a 
writ of mandamus to direct the appellant board of education to admit his 
child to the first grade in the appellant board's school, although the 
child reached age of six years after the "cut-off" date of November 15. 
Under statutory provisions of Montana, each local district has dis-
cretionary power to establish a "cut-off" date governing entrance into 
the first grade. The following, taken from the opinion of the Justices, 
is indicative of the reasoning used in instances where statutory re-
quirements have not covered the point: 
We feel that neither the framers of the Constitution nor 
the legislature could have intended that ••• (should) compel 
local school districts to admit children immediat ely upon 
attaining the age of six years at any time. A reasonable 
interpretation of these provisions, in connection with the 
other provisions requiring a thorough education, is that a 
child must be allowed to enter the first grade sometime 
during his seventh year after reaching his sixth birthday. 
This would be accomplished by admitting children who be-
come six after a "cut-off" date at the commenc ement of the 
next school year. Thus the child whose birthday f alls after 
a "cut-off" date would be admitted the following September 
in the ordinary course of schooling while he is still six 
years old.43 
Another court in 1960 covering the same general point of law r uled 
as did the courts of Montana. In explaining their reasoning the West 
43state ex rel. Ronish v. School District No. 1 of Fergus County 
et al., 348 P~. (2d) 797, 78 A.L.R. (2d) 1012. 
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Virginia Court ruled, 11 ••• the enrollment of youths who reach the age of 
six years sometime after the commencement and during a school term tends 
to disrupt the orderly and efficient operation of the first grades of 
the public schools. 1144 The West Virginia Court expressed in its opin-
ion that the establishment of a "cut-off" date for entrance was within 
the powers of the school officials. It was indicated that the deter-
mination of such questions is for those who are charged with the "gen-
eral supervision of the free schools of the state11 and not for the 
courts to determine. However, the courts may be called upon to deter-
mine if a particular rule is unreasonable or arbitrary. 
In the case filed in relation to Donald Ronish, previously cited, 
the court was required to rule on the reasonableness of a school dis-
trict rule which provided for an initial "cut-off" date of October 31, 
beyond which parents were discouraged from entering their children in 
the first grade. The rule in question further provided that those chil-
dren who became six between October 31 and November 15 could be admitted 
at the parents' request with the understanding that a test was to be 
administered to those children whose birthdays fell between November 1 
and November 15. The court interpreted the rule as a reasonable ruie, 
and although arbitrary dates were established, it was held valid under 
statutory provisions. The Justices indicated that the rule, 11 ••• is not 
a model rule for any school district to adopt, ••• it is a reasonable 
rule. 1145 It was pointed out that by the board rule in question a child 
44Detch v. Board of Educati0n of the County of Greenbrier, 145 
W.Va. 722, 117 S.E. (2d) 138. 
45state ex rel. Ronish v. School District No. 1 of Fergus Cou..~ty 
et al., 348 P~. (2d) 797, 78 A.L.R. (2d) 1012. ~ 
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could be admitted to the first grade up to two and one-half months after 
the start of the school year, and this seemed to be a reasonable length 
of time to hold the school open for enrollment of children entering the 
first grade. In a recent.suit before the Supreme Court of Arizona., it 
was ruled that "The power to admit or exclude children under six years 
of age rests within the discretion of the board of trustees •••• 46 
Colorado statutes leave to the discretion of the local boards of 
education the establishing of 11 cut-off11 .enrollment dates for beginning 
students. The Colorado Supreme Court in 1953 emphasized that a "cut-
off date" is necessary in the proper and efficient regulation of school 
affairs; that a child must start at the begirnling of the -school year to 
be well ordered and to maintain uniformity of program; that where chil-
dren are permitted to enter school during all months of the school year 
it retards the earlier children and discourages the later children who 
develop a feeling that they are not as smart as the older pupils. The 
court in this case ruled ·that the local boards of education were within 
their statutory authority when they established "cut-off dates.,11. How-
ever, they ruled that in the case where a child had been attending the 
first grade in another state, although he was not six years of age until 
December 31 of the school year, was eligible to receive first grade in-
struction in the Colorado school during the second semester. It was 
pointed out by the court that: 
The evidence which was admitted concerning. the ••• establish-
ment of a "cut-off date" for enrollment of beginners is not 
46Harkins et al. v. School District No.!:±. of Maricopa County et 
al., 79 Ariz. 287,~88 P. (2d) 777, (1955°'f." 
applicable to the case of the child who seeks admission to 
the first grade by transfer from another schoo1.47 
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It may be drawn from the preceding paragraphs that eligibility with 
respect to age to attend free the public schools follows the statutes of 
the state. In s0me states statutory provisions bar from admittance into 
the public schools any child who has not reached a specified age by a 
certain calendar date. The 11 cut-offdates" tend to vary from Septem-
ber 1 to January 1. Many states leave to the discretion of local boards 
of education the right to establish "cut-off dates!! for admittance in 
the first grade. The courts have upheld these ncut-off dates, 11 so long 
as they are reasonable, apply to all alike, and do not deprive any per-· 
son the rights guaranteed to him by the State or Federal Constitution. 
Home .9.r Private Instruction in Lieu of School Attendance. Discus-
sion to this point in the study tends to assume that q,]_l people desire 
to obtain the privilege to attend free public schools. However, in 
order to create an enlightened citizenry in keeping with the principles 
and ideals of the American form of government, and in order to prevent 
children reared in America from remaining ignorant and illiterate, com-
pulsory attendance laws have been passed. When the states assmned the 
responsibility for the education of all the children of all the people, 
compulsory attendance laws became necessary in order to prevent the 
growth of an uneducated segment of the population. 
Compulsory attendance laws are now common to all the states. The 
power of states to require the education and training of their children 
47simonson et al. v. School District No. 1:b:, Sup. Ct. Colo.~ 258 P. 
;. (2d) 1128. 
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is well established. Courts have continued in their ·decisions to uphold 
this right of the states. As was ruled by the courts many years ago, 
free schooling furnished by the state is not so much a right granted to 
the pupils as it is a duty imposed upon them for the public good. This 
principle has continually been upheld by the courts as valid. The 
object of the compulsory school attendance law is, then, that all chil-
dren shall be educated. Under compulsory school attendance law stat;.,. 
utes, parents may be required to relinquish custody of their children 
during specified years in order ·that they may attain minimum educational 
standards. Although the compulsory school attendance laws have as their 
purpose to insure the education of all children of all the people, they 
do not specify that the children shall be educated in any particular 
manner or place. 
The Supreme Court of the United States in an historical opinion 
ruled that no state has the authority to require children to attend the 
public schools exclusively. It was held that a requirement of this ty-pe 
is in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constit'l.,l.-
tion.48 
Even though the case cited in the preceding paragraph held that the 
state could not require a child to attend the public schools exclu-
sively, it has been held that instruction received outside the public 
schools must be equivalent to that provided in the public schools for 
children of similar grades and attainments. Litigation in this area of 
school law continues to flourish. Such questions as: Do the compulsory 
48Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and 
~' 268 U.S. 510, 39 A.L.R. 468. 
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attendance laws violate the religious principles of the parents? Do the 
parents have the right to employ private tutors or offer home instruc-
tion for ·their children rather than be compelled to send their children 
to the public school? Does instruction at home by the parent of the 
child satisfy the requirement that the child attend a public, private, 
or parochial school? What are the qualifications for an instructor in 
a private, parochial, or home instructional program? These and similar 
questions have continued to come before the courts. Answers to some of 
the questions pertaining to home instruction, as gleaned from the cases 
ruled upon by the courts of record, are presented in this section of the 
study. 
As a rule, the courts have held that the compulsory school atten-
dance laws are not in violation of parents' religious principles. In a 
case before the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia in 1948, the plain-
tiffs in error appealed a decision handed down by the Nottoway Cou..Dty, 
Virginia, Circuit Court in which the plaintiffs in error were found 
guilty of violating the compulsory attendance law. Their defense l ay in 
the fact that they felt the enforcement of the compulsory attendance 
statute infringed upon their right to "raise, instruct, and educate" 
their children as they saw fit as long as the children were given proper 
education. They contended that according to the Bible the parent is 
charged with the responsibility of teaching and training his children in 
the ways of life. The opinion stated that: 
The religious beliefs of the defendants (plaintiffs in error) 
in the case at bar do not exempt them from complying with the 
reasonable requirements of Virginia laws. The Constitutional 
protection of religious freedom, while it insures religious 
equality, on the other hand does not provide immunity from 
compliance with reasonable civil requirements imposed by the 
state. The individual cannot be permitted, on religious 
grounds, to be the judge of.his duty to obey the regulatory 
laws enacted by the state in the interest of the public 
welfare.49 
Litigation involving parents who believed that compulsory atten-
dance laws violated their ·religious principles was.also ruled upon by 
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the Supreme Court of Washington in 1959. The court in brief but concise 
terms stated that 11We find no merit in the contention, ••• that they are 
excused from the penalties of the compulsory school attendance law be-
cause school attendance is repugnant to their religion. 11 50 ·The reli-
gious belief of parents that it is their duty to train and teach their 
·children, although undoubtedly sincere, has been ruled in the cases 
cited above, as well as in cases before the courts at earlier dates, as 
not sufficient in itself to exempt them from abiding by the compulsory 
education laws. 
Home instruction has, however, been·ruled as satisfying the pro-· 
vision that all children shall be educ.ated. Instruction at home in 
order to exempt a parent from penalties :imposed for violation of com-
pulsory attendance requirements must meet certain qualifications. Basi-
cally, according to the Illinois Supreme Court, 11No parent can be said 
to have a right to deprive his child of educational advantages at least 
commensurate with the standards prescribed for the public schools •••• 11 51 
It was also stated that, 11Those who prefer this method (home instruc-
tion) ••• have the burden of showing·that they have in good faith provided 
49Rice et al. v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 224, 49 S.E. (2d) 342. 
50state ex rel. Shoreline . School Dist!'ict hl,g v. Superio.r Court, 
Sup. Ct. Wash., 346 P. (2d) 999. 
51People v. Levisen et al., 404 ·Ill. 574, 90 N.E. (2d) 213. 
an adequate course of instruction in the prescribed branches of·learn-
ing.1152 
Findings in an Oklahoma case Yl.eard in 1922 in explaining the re-
quirements ne.cessary · for home instruction to satisfy the compulsory 
education law were,. "So long as the child's education was not ne-
glected, ••• these parents ••• had a right to .manage and supervise the 
education of their ·child, if done in a fitting and proficient manner. 11 ?3 
In a recent Oklahoma case in which the parents testified they had 
established a room.equipped with teaching desks, globes, books, and 
other teaching aids, had established a daily·routine including<the 
teaching of reading, writing, arithmetic, Bible study, general health 
and cleanliness, and further the mother·was qualified to instruct her 
·children, it was ruled that this type home instruction satisfied the 
statutory attendance laws of the state.54 
The New York State Supreme Court in 1950 referred to the cases of 
Wright v. State, 21 Okla. Cr. 430, 209 P. 179, and People v. Levisen !ll!. 
al., 404 :Ill .• 574, 90 N.E. (2d) 213, as references when they concluded 
that, provided instruction given is adequate and the sole purpose of 
nonattendance at the public school is not to evade the compulsory edv.-
cation statute, instructions given to a child at home by a parent, who 
is competent to teach,.satisfies the requirements of the compulsory 
education law.55 
52Ibid. 
53wright v. State, 21 Okla. Cr. 430, 209 P. 179. 
54she}pard v.State .of Oklahoma, Gr. Ct. of App. Okla., 306 P. (2d) 
346, (1957 • 
55People v. Turner, 277 App. Div. 317, 98 J>J'.Y.S. (2d) 886. 
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Three cases brought before the courts of record since 1950 have 
ruled that home instruction cannot be considered as satisfying compul-
sory attendance law requirements. In two of the three cases state 
legislation deleted the home instruction proviso as a reason for not at-
tending school. The Supreme Court 0f Kansas ruled in 1963 on an appeal 
from a ·conviction and fine for violation of the compulsory attendance 
law in which the parents contended they preferred to teach their chil-
dren at home, that they were properly qualified, and that it was within 
their rights to teach their children at home. The court in its opinion 
stated that: 
Under the statutes applicable to the instant case, we are 
of the opinion that any school in order to be classed as a 
private school must at least meet the course 0f instruction 
requirements ••• (as established by statute), and the children 
must be taught by a competent instructor in the English lan-
guage for the prescribed time as required by 72-4801 (statute). 
It is our further opinion that any parent who sends a child 
to a school that does not meet these sketchy requirements 
is subject to the penalty provisions of the truancy act. In 
the instant case the defendant's attempt to operate a private 
school resulted in mere scheduled home instruction, which 
is no longer an excuse for nonattendance in the schools of 
the types prescribed in the act.56 
The Washington Court case previously cited also ruled that although 
the parents maintained the teaching of t heir child in the home was com-
parable to that of the public schools and they insisted that she was 
attending a private school as contemplated by law, the home instruction 
did not meet the qualifications of a private school and therefore could 
not satisfy the requirements of the compulsory attendance law.57 
56state of Kansas v. Lowry, 191 Kans. 701, 383 P. (2d) 962. 
57st ate ex rel. Shoreline School District No. l:J1g v. Superior 
Court, Sup. ct:" Wash., 346 P. (2d) 999, (1960).~ 
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A New Jersey case is an example of a ruling in which the question 
of whether home instruction could be considered as an equivalent to in-
struction in the public schools. In the 1950 case, it was held that the 
instruction received was not on pa.r with the program provided in the 
public schools for children of similar grades and attainments. The 
court, in explaining the reasoning used to reach the opinion, stated 
that the children receiving the home instruction, 
••• had no opportunity to associate with other children; that 
the only children they had an opportunity to associate with 
were their brothers and sisters; that this in itself was a 
disadvantage to the children and indicating that the philos-
ophy of modern life is for people through social intercourse 
with one another to learn to better live in our modern world 
•••• the entire lack of free association with other children 
being denied to these two students in question which is af-
forded them at public school leads to the conclusion that 
they are not receiving education equivalent to that provided 
in the public schools.58 
It has been declared that instruction in a private school must also 
be equivalent to instruction received in the public school in order to 
be considered as a substitute for attendance in the public school to 
satisfy requirements of compulsory attendance laws. An appeal from a 
conviction and fine for failure to send their children to school was 
filed with the Fourth District Appellate Court of Illinois in 1962. The 
parents justified their action on the ground that they had organized a 
private school for them. Testimony disclosed that no attendance records 
were kept; there were no registration cards, and none of the teachers 
was certificated. In the opinion it was stated that: 
••• the jury could properly find from the evidence beyond a 
reasonable doubt, ••• that at the time of the trial the private 
58Knox v. O'Brien, 7 N.J. Super. 608, 72 A. (2d) 389. 
school was still disorganized, lacking in system, with mostly 
inexperienced teachers attempting to teach from textbooks 
without uniformity •••• 59 
It was concluded by the appellate court that evidence indicated the par-
ents failed to provide an instructional program equivalent to that fur-
nished in the public schools, and therefore they were guilty of 
violating the state compulsory attendance law. 
From the facts presented pertaining to home and private instr~ction 
as a substitute for public school attendance it was found that: (1) The 
object of compulsory education laws is that all children shall be edu-
cated, not that they shall be educated in a particular manner or place; 
(2) Compulsory attendance laws are common to all the states; (3) No 
state has authority to require children to attend the public schools 
exclusively; (4) Generally, it is held that compulsory attendance laws 
are not in violation of parents' religious principles; (5) Home instr~c-
tion, unless contradictory to statutes and meeting certain requirements, 
has been ruled as satisfying the provisions of compulsory education; 
(6) Instruction given in the home must generally be equivalent to edu-
cation available in the public schools in order to meet the compulsory 
education law requirements; (7) Some states have legislation against 
accepting home instruction as a substitute for private or public school 
attendance; and (8) The State of New Jersey Courts have held that al-
though home instruction may be given by a competent teacher, because of 
the l ack of free association with other children the education is not 
equivalent to that provided in the public schools. 
59People of the St ate of Illinois v. John li· Harrell, 34 Ill. App . 
(2d) 205, 180 N.E:-C2d) 889~. 
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Chapter II of this study has been devoted to a presentation of 
material pertaining to residence and age factors for admission and at-
tendance in the public schools as well as a sununary of recent court 
interpretations of litigation dealing with home or private instruction 
as a substitute to satisfy the compulsory school attendance requirement. 
Specific topics which have been discussed are: (1) Right to .Attend 
School, (2,) Residence As a Factor for Admission, (3) Residents of Chari-
table Institutions, Foster Homes, and Orphanages, (4) Rights of Pupils 
Residing on Federally Owned or Controlled Property, (5) Rights to Ad-
mission of Nonresidents, (6) Age As a Factor for Admission, and(?) Home 
or Private Instruction in Lieu of School Attendance. 
Reserved for the chapter to follow is an analysis of litigation 
pertaining to regulations and conditions which may legally be estab-
lished by state legislatures or local school officials and which must 
be met by a student in order to be eligible to be adrrd.tted to the free 
public school. 
CHAPTER III 
GROUNDS FOR REJECTION OR EXCLUSION FROM 
SCHOOL ADMISSION AND ATTENDANCE 
·An analysis of ·11tigation involving residence and age requirements 
as well as the rights of nonresidents and the right ·Of parents or guard-
ians to provide home or private instruction in lieu of school attendance 
was presented in Chapter II of this study. Another area in which much 
litigation has been brought before the higher ·courts will be presented 
in this chapter. These controversies may be classified under the head-
ing of·"Grounds for Rejection or Exclusion from School Admission and 
Attendance. 11 More specifically, this section of the study is to be de-
voted to an investigation and an analysis of cases relating to the au-
thority of state legislatures or local school officials .to establish 
regulations or conditions which must be abided by in order ~or an appli-
cant to be eligible to receive or ·continue to receive the benefits of 
the free public schools. 
Presented in this chapter·will be regulations pertaining to: secret 
societies, fraternities, and sororities; physical er mental defects as 
grounds for·exclusion; vaccination requirements; right of school offi-
cials to charge tuition and incidental fees; and .dress and personal 
appearance regulations which have been contested in the courts. 
Authority to Prohibit Membership . in Secret Societies, Fraterrij_ ties, 
and Sororities. Courts, gen~~ally, have upheld statutes prohibiting the 
. I 
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organization of fraternities, sororities, and other secret societies in 
the public schools, thus making it illegal for a pupil to belong to a 
school fraternity, sorority, or other secret society. 
The Michigan Supreme Court in 1931 ruled on the section of the 
Michigan General School Law making it unlawful for a pupil to join or 
belong to any school fraternity or student secret society, giving the 
school board power to suspend or expel a violator and declaring it ille-
gal for school officials to graduate an offender. Testimony in the 
trial resulted in .the court's finding that the pupil was a member of Phi 
Epsilon, that he knew the fraternity was being maintained contrary to 
the law and the rules and regulations of the local school authorities, 
and that he knew the penalties for affiliating with the fraternity. In 
upholding the lower ·court the Supreme Court Justices ruled that: 
Plaintiff joined the fraternity in defiance of the law, ex-
hibits no contrition, and now wants his will, and not the 
law, to prevail. Loss of right to school credits and a 
graduate's diploma, based upon a willful violation of the 
statute, does not, by any stretch 0f imagination, constitute 
cruel and unusual punishment.l 
Counsel for the pupil contended that the statute in question ap-
plied to secret societies and his client was not a member of a secret 
society. The Michigan Court answered by quoting the following from the 
statute: 
A public school fraternity, sorority, or secret society, as 
contemplated by this Act, is hereby defined to be any organi-
zation whose active membership is composed totally or chiefly 
of pupils of the public schools of this state and perpetuating 
itself by taking in additional members from the pupils en-
rolled in the public schools on the basis of the decision 
of its membership rather than upon the right of any pupil 
lsteele v. Sexton City Superintendent of Public Schools et al., 
253 Mich. 32, 234 N.W. 436. 
who is qualified by the rules of the school to be a member 
of and take part in any class or group exercise.2 
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The Florida Legislature of 1943 enacted statutes banning the orga-
nization of fraternities, sororities, and other secret organizations in 
the public schools of Florida and prohibiting pupils enrolled therein 
from becoming members of such organizations. As a result of this leg-
islation, Satan Fraternity, an unincorporated association, and others, 
brought suit against the Board of Public Instruction for the County of 
Dade seeking a declaratory decree and challenging the validity of the 
act. Plaintiffs challenged the validity of the act on the ground, among 
others, that it deprived them of their inalienable right to life, liber-
ty, the pursuit of happiness, due process of law, and liberty of speech 
as guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States and the Constitu-
tion of the State of Florida. 
An adverse decree was handed down by the Chancellor in the Circuit 
Court, and an appeal was made to the Florida Supreme Court which was 
heard in 1945. Most courts are in agreement with the opinion of the 
Supreme Court Judges in upholding this appeal when they said that: 
••• the right to attend an educational institution provided 
by the state is not a natural right but a public benefaction 
and those who seek to become beneficiaries of them must sub-
mit to such regulations and conditions as the law imposes 
as a prerequisite to participate. The public schools of 
Florida are supported by and controlled by the legislature 
and it may impose such disciplinary measures as it sees fit 
on those who attend them.3 
The antifraternity law of Florida was found by this court to be legal 
2Ibid. 
3satan Fraternity et al. v. Board of Public Instruction f or Dade 
County et al., 156 Fla. 222, 22 So. (2d) 892. 
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and that " ••• nothing in the act ••• trenches on due process, the right to 
assembly, equal protection of the law, or any other liberty guaran-
teed •••• 11 The court concluded that: 
It is pertinent to state that none of our liberties are ab-
solute; all of them may be limited when the common good or 
common decency requires •••• Freedom after all is not some-
thing turned footloose to run as it will like a thorough-
bred in a blue grass meadow.4 
In 1944 the Legislature of Louisiana enacted legislation granting 
to the various parish school boards the power and authority to abolish 
high school fraternities and sororities. During the same year the act 
was attacked as unconstitutional and denial of students' constitutional 
rights. The Act, according to the Uriited States District Court Judges, 
is not unconstitutional in denying students "due process of lawn or 
"privileges or ·immunities" as citizens of the United States. They 
stated that: 
Because of the disciplinary measures which.the state legis-
lature and the Caddo Parish·School·Board are seeking to es-
tablish in the schools under their respective police authority, 
this student may be legally compelled to comply with these 
measures.5 
Eight years later, in litigation before the Supreme Court of 
Oregon, the opinion of the court agreed with the opinions of the cases 
discussed in the preceding paragraphs. This court held that there need 
not be any high degree of ritual mystery to bring organizations within 
the category of ·11 secret. 11 According to these judges a pledge or oath 
not to reveal secrets of the society, a secret password or grip_or 
4Ibid. 
5Hughes et al. v. Caddo Parish School Board et al., 65 S. Ct. 562, 
323 U.S. 685. 
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rituals including initiation ceremonies which members are obligated not 
to disclose, are sufficient for the organization to be classed as se-
cret. They further ruled that when children avail themselves of the 
opportunity to receive education at public expense that they must 
" ••• submit to discipline of the schools and the regulations reasonably 
calculated to promote the discipline and high purposes for which the 
schools are established. 11 6 The Oregon Court in its ruling on the stat-
ute and the local school board regulation prohibiting secret societies 
ruled that no rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution are in-
fringed upon by the statute and stated that: 
Rules adopted by the constituted authorities for the gover-
nance of pupils of public schools must be presumed to be 
based upon mature deliberation for the welfare of the com-
munity •••• No personal right stands superior to the public 
welfare in this particular.? 
Statutes prohibiting the organization of fraternities, sororities, 
and other secret societies in the public schools and forbidding member-
ship of public school pupils in such organizations are held by the 
courts to be valid. Legislation restricting or prohibiting membership 
in secret societies has been upheld as constitutional and not in viol a-
tion of rights guaranteed under provisions of State and Federal Consti-
tutions. The right of the local board of education to adopt a rule or 
regulation controlling or prohibiting fraternities, sororities, and se-
cret societies within the school in the absence of state legislation 
giving them that authority is not so clearly defined. I n most cases a 
6Burkitt et al. v. School District No. 1 Multnomah County et al ., 
195 Ore. 471, 246""""'p. (2d) 566. 
7Ibid. 
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local rule providing for nonadmission or expulsion of pupils holding 
membership in secret societies has been considered valid and within the 
authority of the local board. 
Controversy between a student and the Board of Education of the 
City of Durham, North Carolina, over the right of the Board to adopt a 
resolution relating to membership of pupils in secret societies and fra-
ternities was appealed to the Supreme Court of North Carolina in 1944. 
The opinion of the court in this case represents the majority of the 
rulings on the prerogative of the local school officials to adopt poli-
cies regulating or prohibiting secret societies in the absence of stat-
utes empowering them with that authority. The judges ruled that 
membership in secret societies in the public schools is subject to 
regulations of the local board; the regulating of these organizations 
is within the authority vested in the board by law; such regulations do 
not constitute unlawful discrimination against the pupils, and they are 
considered reasonable. The following statements from the opinion are 
indicative of the reasoning used in their ·ruling: 
The state provides free educational facilities for the 
children of the state, and each child has a ·right to attend 
the schools of his district. But this is not an absolute 
right. Schools to be effective and fulfill the purposes for 
which they are intended must be operated in an orderly manner. 
Machinery to that end must be provided. Reasonable rules 
and regulations must be adopted. The right to attend school 
and claim the benefits afforded by the public school system 
is the right to attend subject to all lawful rules and regu-
l ations prescribed for the goverrunent thereof.8 
In further ·explaining the relationship of the legislature to the public 
schools and reasoning that the City of Durham Board of Education was 
8coggins et al . v. Board of Education of City of Durham, 223 N.C. 
763, 28 S.E. (2d) 527. 
within its legal authority to establish restrictions on membership in 
secret societies, the opinion states: 
The establishment and operation of the public school 
system is under the control of the legislative branch of the 
government, subject only to pertinent constitutional provi-
sions as to uniformity. It may delegate to local adminis-
trative units the power to make such rules and regulations 
as may be deemed necessary and expedient, and when so dele-
gated it is peculiarly within the province of the adminis-
trative officers of the local unit to determine what things 
are detrimental to the successful management, good order, 
and discipline of the schools in their charge and the rules 
required to produce those conditions •••• Only thus may they 
fully exercise the "general control and supervision over all 
matters pertaining to" the schools connnitted to their care.9 
Among the conditions of the resolution being questioned in the 
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North Carolina case was that membership in fraternities and secret soci-
eties would prevent the child from t aking part in school activities such 
as intramural and interscholastic activities both athletic and literary 
and all other ·extracurricular privileges and advantages of the public 
school. The court in upholding the board regulation indicated that the 
child was not denied the right to participate in extracurricular activ-
ities but that the regulation, 
••• merely made optional with him to determine whether ••• he 
prefers to continue membership in a secret society and there-
by forfeit participation in the privileges afforded by the 
extracurricular activities of the schools •••• 10 
In the case of Isgrig et al. v. Srygley et al., 210 Ark. 5go, 197 
S.W. (2d) 39 (1946), heard by the Supreme Court of Arkansas, it was 
concluded that rules of a school board declaring high school students 
who participate in fraternities or sororities ineligible for specific 
9Toid. 
l Oibid. 
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extracurricular activities and honors were authorized by statutes charg-
ing local school boards with duty of doing all things necessary and law-
ful for conducting efficient free public schools. 
The Court of Appeals ·of Ohio in 1962 held that the local board of 
education had inherent authority u..~der the statutes concerning the pow-
ers of boards of education to enforce the policy prohibiting pupils from 
participating in certain high school extracurricular activities if they 
maintained membership in fraternities, sororities, or other organiza-
tions of similar ·nature. The conclusions reached by the court were; 
••• that the Board of Education of the City of Columbus acted 
within the scope of its authority in adopting the regulation; 
••• that such authority is ••• inherent in the Board; that the 
provisions of this regulation are not unreasonable or arbi-
trary; that the enforcement of this regulation in a reasonable 
manner ••• will not deprive the plaintiffs of any Constitutional 
rights or natural privileges as citizens or pupils of the 
public schools; that this court has no authority to inter-
fere with the exercise of the discretion vested in the Board 
of Education of the City of Columbus •••• 11 
In 1945 the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas also ruled that a 
school board under its authority to adopt regulations for the well-being 
of the school, 
••• may deny to pupils belonging to a secret fraternity ••• the 
right .of participating in athletic, military, literary, and 
similar school organizations, although the meetings of the 
fraternity are held outside of the school house, after school 
hours, and with parental consent, where it is shown that such 
societies have a tendency to destroy good order, discipline, 
scholarship, and such a tendency is sufficiently shown by 
fraternity publications containing articles written in a 
spirit of insubordination to the school authorities •••• 12 
llHolroyd et al. v. Eibling et al., Ct. of Corrnn. Pl. Ohio, 188 N.E. 
(2d) 797. 
12wilson et al. v. Abilene Independent School District ·et al., Civ . 
Ct. App. Texas-;-190 S.W. (2d) 406. 
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Although the Texas Court ruled that the local school board had the 
power to prohibit membership in fraternities if it felt that membership 
in such organizations was detrimental to the efficiency of the schools, 
the Court concluded that attempting to extend the regulation to the va-
cation period was an abuse of the board's discretion. It was concluded: 
••• that the attempt on the part of the board to extend such 
regulations to cover the period during which the school was 
in summer vacation, would be an undue invasion of parental 
authority •••• to extend the rule of ·1oco parentis to such 
length ••• would be shocking to every concept of parental au-
thority. Furthermore, during said vacation period the teachers 
and pupils are scattered and it would be practically unen-
forceable.13 
Cases upholding the reasonableness of the rule forbidding or regu-
lating membership in fraternities and other ·secret societies point out 
that such organizations have a marked influence on the school by the 
fact that they tend to destroy discipline, good order, and scholarship. 
In one case, however, a Missouri Court was of the opinion that frater-
nity membership is ·not detrimental to the schools and it was held that 
a law forbidding or regulating such membership was unreasonable and un-
enforceable. Action was brought, in the Missouri case mentioned, to 
enjoin the St. Louis Board of Education from enforcing a rule adopted by 
it declaring that pupils who become and remain members of a high school 
fraternity are rendered ineligible to represent the school in any manner 
or participate in any of its graduation exercises. The court in its 
opinion ruled that, generally, reasons for denying public school advan-
tages to the pupil may be left to the discretion of the board of educa-
tion. They concluded however that: 
13Ibid. 
There is nothing shown as to the conduct of the pupils alleged 
to be within the purview of the rule to support the conclu-
sion that their membership in the societies designated has 
proved detrimental to the operation and control of the school. 
We therefore ••• enter a decree herein perpetually enjoining 
the respondent from in any manner enforcing the rule in ques-
tion.14 
The view taken by the Missouri Court discussed in the preceding 
paragraph stands alone in the cases before the courts in recent years. 
Even in this case, two judges sitting on this hearing dissented to the 
opinion submitted by the majority. 
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From the cases examined and cited, it is found that the courts have 
held invariably that the state legislature may enact legislation prohib-
iting fraternities, sororities, and other similar organizations in the 
public schools of the state and may authorize boards of education to ex-
elude from the public schools pupils maintaining such membership. In 
the absence of statutes relating to membership in secret societies, the 
weight of authority is to the effect that rules and regulations by a 
board of education forbidding membership of pupils in such organizations 
and reconnnending punishment for violation by expulsion of the pupils or 
declaring them ineligible to participate in certain school activities, 
are valid. 
Physical ~ Mental Defects As Grounds for Re,jection Qr Exclusion of 
Applicants for Admission. This section of the study is devoted to an 
examination of litigation brought before the courts pertaining t o t he 
right of school officials to require certain health requirements be met 
in order for a pupil to be eligible to receive public school privileges . 
14Wright et al. v. Board of Education of St. Louis , 295 Mo . 466, 
246 s.w. 43. 
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Inasmuch as a great number of cases have been before the courts of rec-
ord relating to vaccination and :immunization regulations, an analysis 
of these cases will be reserved to a later section and wlll not be pre-
sented under this section of the study. 
As has been pointed out, the right of a child to attend the public 
schools is not absolute. This right is subordinate to the general wel-
fare. A pupil, it has been ruled, may be excluded from school if he 
fails to undergo a physical examination or present a doctor's certifi-
cate attesting to the satisfactory condition of his health if the local 
board requires either as a condition of admission. This principle is 
aptly illustrated by a case which arose in South Dakota. For several 
years the Board of Education of the City of Aberdeen School District had 
a resolution in force in its schools requiring pupils to obtain and fur-
nish a 11Physical Record Card" at the beginning of each school year. One 
side of the card was to be filled out by a regular licensed physician, 
with the pupil and parent having the option to use a physician of their 
own selection at their own expense, or the examination could be made and 
the card filled out by a physician furnished by the board of education 
at the expense of the school district. The appellant in the case had 
. two children of school age who sought admission into the schools of 
respondent school district, however, appellant refused to furnish the 
completed "Physical Record Card" and his children were denied adJnission 
into the schools. The appellant contended that the examination called 
for " ••• may result in such mental suggestion of diseases as may result 
in mental disease germs, •••• " and the board of education was adding 
to the qualifications for admission prescribed by law. The South Dakota 
Supreme Court in its ruling in favor of the respondent school district 
stated that: 
Under the regulation complained of, no person is excluded 
from the school, except upon his own volition. Respondents 
merely seek to learn those things, concerning the mental 
and physical condition of the pupil, which they think .use-
ful and needful in the proper discharge of the functions 
of the school, and especially in the proper handling of the 
individual pupil. The report asked for would lead to the 
exclusion of the pupil only ••• when it showed that the child 
was then suffering from some disease rendering .it a menace 
to its associates.15 
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The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 1941 in its opinion 
stated that: 
••• the power of a school committee to exclude children from 
school is very broad and is to be exercised for the "best 
interests of the pupils and of the. people. 11 ••• protection 
of the health of other 6upils may furnish a ground for ex-
clusion of a child •••• l 
In a case appealed from a District Court order, the Supreme Court 
of North Dakota ruled that school officials could deny admission to the 
public schools to children who were affected or were suspected of being 
affected by a communicable disease, and who were not under treatment at 
the time. The opinion stated that: 
The order of exclusion ••• cannot be said to be u..11.reasonable. 
It only excludes those whose cases are positive and suspected, 
who are not at the time under treatment. The seriousness of 
the disease and its communicable character afford ample foun-
dation for such an order; and, even conceding that it may be 
doubted in.the instant case whether the children in question 
are affected, the doubt is one that must be resolved in favor 
of the authorities charged with the serious responsibility 
of preventing the spread of the disease.17 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in an u,.~precedented 
15streich v. Board of Education of Independent School District of 
City of Aberdeen et al., 34 S.D. 169, 147 N.W. 779. 
16commonwealth v. Johnson et .§:1_., 309 Mass. 476, 35 N.E. (2d) 801. 
17Martin v. Craig~ al., 42 N.D. 213, 173 N.W. 787. 
case ruled that: 
In the exercise of their broad powers ••• giving the school 
committee general superintendency of all public schools, 
the decision of the committee involving the exercise of judg-
ment and discretion, as to excluding from school a child be-
cause afflicted with head lice, is not reviewable by the 
courts when they act in good faith •••• 18 
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Not only have the courts upheld the right of local boards of educa-
tion in excluding pupils from attendance in the public schools for fail-
ing to meet certain physical health requirements, but they have also 
ruled that the local school officials may exclude children of limited 
intelligence who are unable to benefit from a cormnon school educational 
program and who interfere with the progress of others. Such a ruling 
was made in a 1937 Massachusetts case when the Justices stated that 
npupils .of such intellectual capacity and weakness of mind as to inter--
f ere with the progress of others may be excluded. 1119 
A ruling in 1958 by the Supreme Court of Illinois agreed with the 
Massachusetts Court when it was concluded that: 
••• legislation does not require the state to provide a free 
educational program, as a part of the cormnon school system, 
for the feeble minded or mentally deficient children who, 
because of limited intelligence, are u..riable to receive a 
good cormnon school education.20 
Another ruling in 1958, this by the Supreme Court of New York, also 
agreed with the opinions submitted by the judges in the two preceding 
cases. Parents of a seventeen-year-old retarded child brought a 
18carr v. In.habitants of Town of Dighton, 229 Mass. 304, 118 N.E. 
525. 
19Nicholls v. Mayor and School Committee of L:vri..n, 297 Mass. 65, 7 
N .E. (2d) 577. 
20Dept. of .Public Welfare v. Haas, 15 Ill. (2d) 204, 15~- N.E. (2d) 
59 
proceeding against the Board of Education of the City of New York and · 
others compelling·the board to provide classes for their retarded child 
as well as other children similarly situated until they reached the age 
of twenty-one years. The board of e:ducation policy called for a deter-
mination of capability of the student's benefiting from further ·common 
school education when a mentally retarded child reached age seventeen. 
It had been determined by the school system that the child in question 
could no longer benefit .. from instruction, and he was refused acceptance 
into any of the classes in the school system. In the opinion handed 
down by this court, it was ruled that the Board of Education of the City 
of New York was justified in refusing to continue providing classes for 
seventeen-year-old mentally retarded children, 11 ••• where there was a 
determination that they were not capable of benefiting by further·edu-
cation •••• The Board is not required.," according to the ruling, 11 ••• to 
stultify itself by setting up so call.ed classes where in fact the only 
result can be custodial care. 11 21 
The case which is referred to quite often in the later ·opi:rions is 
one which arose in Wisconsin in 1919. In a mandamus suit to compel the 
.Board of Education of the City of Antigo to reinstate and admit.to the 
Public Schools of Antigo the petitioner's son who, among other defects, 
had a peculiar high, rasping, disturbing tone of voice, accompanied w.i.th 
uncontrollable facial contortions, making it difficult for him to make 
himself understood, and an uncontrollable flow of saliv~a which drooled 
from his mouth upon his clothing and books, causing him to present an 
21Elgin et al. v. Silver ·et al., 15 Misc. (2d) 864, 182 N.Y.S. (2d) 
669. 
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unclean appearance. The Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that "The 
right of a ·child of school age to attend public schools of this state 
cannot be insisted upon when its presence therein is harmful to the best 
interests of the school. 11 22 
From the cases cited and discussed it is found that: (1) a local 
board of education may establish as a condition of admission a regula-
tion requiring pupils who desire to attend its schools to submit to a 
physical examination or present a doctor's statement certifying to the 
satisfactory condition of the pupil's general health, (2) a local board 
of education has power to make reasonable regulations to guard the 
health of the pupils in its schools, (3) a local board of education may 
exclude from its schools pupils who, because of their limited mental 
ability, can no longer benefit from common school education, and (4) a 
local board of education may exclude from its schools pupils whose pres-
ence is harmful to the best interests of the .school. 
Vaccination Requirement for Acceptance, Rejection,.£!: Exclusion. 
Another frequent-requirement-for a pupil to be eligible for attendance 
in the public schools is vaccination against smallpox. In many states, 
children must submit to smallpox vaccination before they will be per-
mitted to enter the schools. As pointed out in an earlier section of 
this study, all states have compulsory attendance laws requiring parents 
of pupils within certain age limits to keep the pupils in school or to 
provide other approved educational arrangaments for ·them. Many cases 
have been before the courts in which parents have refused to abide by 
---------:· I 
22state ex rel."Beattie v. Board of Education of City of Antigo, 
169 Wis. 231,:L72 N.W. 153. 
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vaccination requirements for their ·children. As a result, the children 
were excluded from the public schools, and the parents have been charged 
with violating the compulsory attendance laws. During the period of 
time under investigation in·the study, i~e., the past forty years, an 
average of almost one case per year involving litigation relative to 
vaccination requirements for admission into.the public schools has been 
before the courts of record in the United States. The writer, after in-
vestigating the cases, prepared briefs on twenty-eight of these cases. 
In order·to obtain the reasoning of the courts.in recent years, 
cases cited and discussed are limited primarily to those brought before 
the courts during the past two .dec.ades. Al though · the Supreme Court of 
the United States has decided that the state legislature may require the 
vaccination of children as a requirement precedent to their ·right to at-
tend the public schools, much litigation has transpired on this point of 
law. Two cases decided by the United States Supreme Court during the 
Twentieth Century clearly indicated that it is within the power·of the 
state to enact compulsory vaccination laws as a legal means by which the 
public health may be safeguarded. In the case decided in 1905 the court 
stated that: 
In its unquestioned power to preserve and protect the public 
health, it is for the legislature of each state to determine 
whether vaccination is effe.ctive in preventing the spread of 
smallpox or not, and, deciding:in the affirmative, to require 
doubti;:ig .individuals to yield for the welfare of the commu-
nity.23 
In Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 43 Sup. Ct. 24, 67 L. Ed. 194, 
23Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 35 Sup. 
Ct. 358, 49 L. Ed. 643. 
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(1922), the court also held that compulsory vacci nat ion stat utes are a 
valid exercise of the police power of the state and that 11 ••• t he welfare 
of the many was far superior to that of the few who might r esist •• • • " 
The statute in the State of New York requiring children t o be vac-
cinated in order that they may attend the public schools was cont ested 
in 1944. It was ruled that the statute was not in violation of consti-
tutional guarantees and was enforceable even though it might be dis-
tasteful to an individual. The court in its opinion stated that: 
The l aw as enacted by the St ate Legislature is founded on 
sound principle •••• The experience of the r ace has t aught 
that to protect the health of comrnunities ••• precautions 
must be t aken against the spreading of disease; and vacci-
nation is necessary to prevent not only sickness of the 
person not vaccinated, but consequences to those with whom 
such person might come in contact after being attacked and 
r avaged by t he disease which vaccination prevents . 
In a democracy l aws are not made to meet the predilec-
tions of individuals •••• Laws are made for the protection 
of all, and such l aws are enforced even if the law i s dis-
t asteful to some individual--yes, even if the l aw i s hate-
ful to some individual . 24 
The Arkansas Supreme Court ruled on the validi t y of the compulsory 
vaccination requirement for school attendance i n 1964, and i n its ruli ng 
upholding the requirement stated " ••• authorities of the St at e of Arkan-
sas have adopted a r egulat ion r equiri ng vaccinat ion • ••• There is no ques-
tion about the validity of this regulation. 11 25 Just one year l ater, the 
same court concluded in its ruling on the same point of l aw t hat , 11We 
reaffirm that the health r egulation in question is a reasonable exercise 
of police power on a subject of paramount and compelling state i nt erest 
24In ~ Whitmore, 47 N.Y.S. (2d) 143 . 
25Cude v. St ate of Arkansas et al. , Sup . Ct . Ark. , 377 S.W. (2d) 
816. 
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and, therefore, is valid.n26 
A rule which·requires that all pupils must be vaccinated as a ·con-
dition of entry into the.pubiic schools, provided statutory authority 
exists, may be enforced by school officials according to the opinions 
' handed down by state·supreme courts and the United States Supreme Court. 
Much litigation has been in the.courts.in instances where permissive 
statuto.ry provisions exist relating to vaccination requirements. In all 
the recent cases :examined, the courts have ruled that the school offi- · · 
cials.may establish vaccination requirements if the'legislature had del-
egated this authority to ,the lo.cal boards of education. A Kentucky case 
was heard in 1948 in which the parents of children excluded from the 
Glasgow City ·Schools for ·failure to .comply with the vaccination. require-
ments of ·the .local board of education illustrates the rea'soning used by 
·the courts on this matter. In its ruling, the Kentucky Court: 13tated 
that; 11 ••• we are convinced that the school board had the right to pro-
mulgate and enforce its own rules requiring compulsory vaccination of 
the children •••• "27 
In a 1963 case heard by the Court of Appeals of Ohio it was con-
eluded · in ·. the opinion that, 
•• ~the board.still retains full authority to compel :i.rrnntmi-
zation.to ·prevent.the spread o:;f.cormnunicable diseases. This 
26wright et al. v. DeWitt School .:District No. 1 of Arka...11sas Co., 
Sup. Ct. Ark., 385 S.W. (2d) 644~. · · . . . 
27Mosier·v •. Barren.County Board of Health, 308 Ky. 829, 215 S.W. 
(2d) 967. State~ rel. Dunham v. Board of Education.of City School 
District of Cincinnati, 96 N.E •. (2d) 413, (1951) and Board of Educaticm 
· of Mountain Lakes v. ~' 152 A. (2d) 394, (1959) are other recent 
cases in which the opinions uphold the right ·Of the local board of edu-
cation.to establishcompulsoryvaccinat;i.on.requirements. 
they do by making and enforcing such rules and regulations 
to secure the vaccination and :irnrnu..-rtlzation of pupils. It 
is not required, for example, to permit an un:i.mrnunized pupil 
to continue in schoo1.28 
From the rulings on this point of law, it is held then that, when a 
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board under permissive legislation adopts a policy requiring vaccination 
for admission to the schools, the effect is the same as if it were re-
quired by statute in that the threat of an epidemic does not have to 
exist in order for the requirement to be valid. 
Of·the. several cases before the courts of record in recent years, 
the one which most adequately illustrates the majority opinion on the 
question of the validity of vaccination regulations in the absence of 
an epidemic is one brought before the Superior Court of New Jersey in 
1959. The defendant had argued among other points that compulsory vac-
cinationin Mountain Lakes was not necessary because there had been no 
case .of smallpox for almost a decade. The court in its opinion stated 
that: 
The absence of an existing emergency does not warrant a de-
nial to the regulative agency of the exercise of preventive 
means. A local board of education need not await an epidemic, 
or even a single sickness or death, before it decides upon 
action to protect the public. To hold otherwise would be 
to destroy prevention as a means of combatting the spread 
of disease.29 
.All other analyzed cases ruling on this point of law were in agree.ment 
with the opinion expressed by the New Jersey Court. 
In many of the cases brought before the courts in connection w-lth 
28state ax rel. Mack v. Board of Education of Covington, 1 Ohio 
App. (2d) 143, 204 N.E. (2d) 86. 
29Board of Education of Mou..n.tain Lakes v. Maas, 56 N. ,J. Super. 245, 
152 A. (2d) 394. - --
65 
vaccination requirements, those opposing the regulation have contended 
the requirement is in violation to their religious beliefs and therefore 
violates their religious freedom as guaranteed by the Constitution. The 
parents in a Georgia case in 1951 objected to the immunization on the 
ground it was against their religious belief and the court ruled that 
the refusal on the part of the parents to have their children vaccinated 
amounted to a transgression of the rights of others when they held that, 
11A person's right to exercise religious freedom ••• ceases where it over-
laps and transgresses the rights of others. Everyone's rights must be 
exercised with due regard to the rights of others •••• 1130 
In a similar case the Arkansas Supreme Court in 1965 also upheld 
the school officials when it ruled that the parents, 
••• are at liberty to enjoy unrestrained their religious opin-
ions and beliefs. However, their freedom to act according to 
their religious beliefs is subject to a reasonable regulation 
for the benefit of society as a whole.31 
It may be stated from the opinions of the cases cited and discussed 
that: (1) statutes requiring vaccination of children as a prerequisite 
to admission to public schools have been held to be a valid exercise of 
the police power of the state, (2) compulsory vaccination regulations 
adopted by local boards of education in states where permissive legis-
lation exists have been held by the courts to be valid, (3) a threat of' 
an epidemic does not have to be present for vaccination requirements t o 
be valid, and (4) compulsory vaccination requirements do not violate 
religious beliefs of the individual. 
30Anderson et al. v. State, 84 Ga. Supp. 259, 65 S.E. (2d) 848. 
31Wright et al. v. DeWitt School District No. 1 Arkansas County, 
Sup. Ct. Ark., 385 S.W. (2d) 644. 
66 
Rights of Boards of Education to Charge Tuition, Matriculation,.£!.: 
Incidental Fees. Instruction in the public schools of a district gener-
ally is free to all children of all the people who meet the residence 
and age requirements established by the state legislature. Most state 
constitutions provide for public education in which children meeting 
certain requirements may be educated free of charge. Likewise, those 
children not satisfying the established requirements are not entitled to 
receive free public schooling. It is well established that pupils not 
meeting these requirements may be excluded from attendance in the public 
schools unless tuition fees are paid. It was held by the Supreme Court 
of North Dakota in 1958 in the case of Kessler v. Board of Education of 
City of Fessenden, 87 N.W. (2d) 743, that a minor child not a resident 
of the Fessenden district, could be admitted to the Fessenden School if 
her admission would not injure or overcrowd the school and if her father 
agreed to pay tuition for her attendance. 
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin in 1962 ruled that a school district 
may " ••• accept a high school pupil from some other district ••• pr ovided 
the necessary parental agreement to pay nonresident tuition is made. 1132 
Not a single case was found in court records covering this period i n-
vestigated which determined that a school district must admit nonresi -
dent pupils without payment of tuition by the pupil's resident district, 
his parents, or some other agency. On the other hand, however, the 
courts have ruled that, under statutes providing for the maintenance of 
a free common school system, a school board cannot impose a tuition 
32union Free High School District No. 1 Town of Iron River v. Joint 
School District No. 1 of the Towns of Maple et al., 17 Wis. (2d) 409 , 
117 N.W. (2d) 277S: - - -- - - -
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charge on a resident pupil of school age. The Supreme Court of Wiscon-
sin ruled that the City of Oshkosh Schools could legally charge a t u-
ition fee to two classes of pupils, those being nonresidents and t hose 
over school age. It was ruled that the school was not author i zed to 
charge tuition of any kind to pupils meeting residence and age r equire-
ments. This was made quite clear when it stated in its opinion t hat: 
The pupil in a district school is just as much entitled to 
have manual training t aught hjm without the exaction of a 
charge, if it be taught at all, as he is to have mathematics 
taught without being obliged to pay therefore.33 
The Missouri Court in 1927 also ruled that it was unconstitutional 
for boards of education 11 ••• to require payment of a tuition fee by a 
minor residing in the district and entitled to gratuitous instruction i n 
the public schools. 1134 In an appeal to the Supreme Court of North 
Dakota the Supreme Court upheld the District Court which ruled that 
Williston, North Dakota Schools could not charge a fee f or students who 
attended school over ~our years. The school officials had passed a res-
olution indicating that a fee would be charged f or those students who 
attended school beyond four years in high school. It was their conten-
tion that the particular boy involved in this case failed t o compl ete 
the requirements for graduation due to idleness, i ndifference, indo-
lence, and laziness. The Supreme Court ruled in its opi nion that "Pay-
ment for school privileges cannot be exacted from a bad . or i ndol ent 
pupil anymore than it can from a good and industrious one. 11 I n further 
commenting on its ruling it stated that "No statute can be f ound which 
419. 
33Maxcy v. City of Oshkosh et al., 144 Wis. 238, 128 N.W. 899 . 
34state ~rel.Roberts v. Wilson et al., 221 Mo . App . 9, 297 s .w. 
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attempts to authorize the :iJn.position of a tuition charge on resident 
children of school age. 1135 
There is conflict in the opinions of the courts as to t he right of 
a public school to exact an incidental or matriculation f ee f rom stu-
dents. In approximately one-half of the cases analyzed, the courts held 
that such a fee cannot be charged to resident children . A case befor e 
the Supreme Court of Georgia ruled against the chargi ng of a matricula-
tion fee by the board of education which indicated that the charge was 
necessary in order to conduct a full school term. In its ruli ng the 
Supreme Court concluded that: 
A charge for matriculation cannot be :iJn.posed as a condition 
precedent to the admission of children to a public school 
forming a part of the general school system of children living 
in the territory of the school and otherwise qualified •••• tge 
public schools shall be free to all children of the state.3 
Another ·case in which the courts ruled against the charging of an 
incidental fee was one brought before t he Supreme Court of Arkansas in 
1952. In affirming the lower courts' decision, the Justices stated 
that: 
••• as long as a public school is operated as such , t hen there 
must be "gratuitous i nstruction," as stated i n t he Constitu-
tion; ••• district cannot by i ndirection--such as a r egist r ation 
fee--violate the clear spirit and plain wording of the Con-
stitution.37 
35Batty v. Board of Education of City of Williston et al ., 67 N.D. 
6, 269 N.W. 49. 
36Moore et al. v. Brinson et al., 170 Ga . 680 , 154 S.E. 141. 
3 7Dowell et al. v. School District No. 1 Boone County et al . , 220 
Ark. 828, 250 S.W. (2d) 127. Claxton et al. v. St anford et al ., 160 Ga. 
573, 128 S.E. 887, and Morris et al. v. Vandiver et al ., 164 Miss . 476, 
145 So. 228, are other cases in which it was ruled that a l ocal public 
school cannot charge matriculation or ·incidental fees to i ts resident 
pupils who are of legal school age. 
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School authorities may, under the terms of some state statutes, 
charge incidental and matriculation fees for·sch0ol purposes of pupils 
in the public schools. · The Alabama Statute indicates that the schools 
have the right to ·make a matriculation charge. The local board of edu-
cation with the approval of the county board of education can determine 
the amount of the charge. This statute was declared valid and consti-
tutional by the Supreme Court-of Alabama in 1931.38 Again in 1957 this 
same court was ruling on the validity of the charging of matriculation 
and incidental fees to public .school pupils. Again the court ruled that 
a board of education is within its authority to charge_such fees and 
.that such fees " ••• were held not to be tuition and not in .conflict with 
a statutory requirement that a public school. system be free to minors 
over seven years of age. 1139 
From the discussion of the cases cited :relating to the rights of 
boards of educati6n to charge tuition, incidental, and matriculation 
fees, it may be stated that (1) a board of education may legally charge 
tuition fees to nonresident pupils, (2) a board 0f education carL~ot le-
gally impose a tuition charge on a resident pupil of school age., (3) in 
some cases the courts have held that incidental and matriculation fees 
cannot be charged resident pupils, and (4) a local board of education 
may under statutory provisions charge incidental and matriculation fees 
38vincent v. County Board .Q!.Ed.ucation·of Talladega Cotmty, 222 
Ala. 216, · 131 So • 893 • 
39shirey ~ al. v. City.Boarcl. of Education 2f Fort Payne, 94 So. 
(2d) 758. Other ·rulings in agreement with tl:le; opinions.expressed by 
the Alabama Supreme Court ruling that a board of education may charge 
incidental fees are found in Felder·v. Johnston et al., 127 S.C. 215, 
121 S.E. 54, and Roberts v. Bright et al., 222 Ala. 677, 133 So. 907. 
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to resident pupils in the public schools. 
Dress and Personal Appearance Requirements. Many court decisions 
have ruled that.school boa:t'ds have the authol"ity to establish and en-
force rules and regulations relating·to pupil conduct and may exercise 
such power of control over·pupils as may be reasonably necessary to ·en-
able school officials to effect the general purpose of education. Gen-
erally, the courts will not interfere with such matters unless a clear 
abuse of discretion is evident or unless the requirement or.regulation 
is clearly unreasonable. 
In agreement with the general pl"inciple that school officials may 
make rules and regulations governing the conduct.of pupils under their 
control, it has been held in the.few cases which have lDeen adj.udicated 
on the subject that school officials may prescribe the kind of dress 
worn by students or may make reasonable regulations as to the personal 
appearance of the pupils. A unique ·case relating to a board of edu-
cation regulation pertaining to control of personal appearance of pupils 
in school was decided by the Supreme Cc:mrt of Arkansas in 1923. The 
appellant, a school age child residing in School District No. 11 of Clay 
County, Arkansas, was contesting a local school board policy which·read 
as follows: "The wearing of transparent hosiery, low necked dresses or 
any style of clothing tending toward :i.lmn.odesty in dress, or the use of 
face paint or cosmetics, is prohibited." The appellant violated this 
rule by the use of talcum powder ·on her fac·e and was denied admission to 
the school as long as she continued the use·of the powder. The court 
upheld the policy and declared it reasonable. In explai..'Yling its conclu-
sion that the rule was reasonable, it. stated that it would be proper for 
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the court to consider whether the rule involved any 11 1 ••• e ement of op-
pression or humiliation to th . e pupil, and what consumption of t:i.Jrre or 
y is required to comply with it.n40 expenditure of mone · . The court con-
cluded that the rul d.d e l not appear lLDreasonable in any of these re-
spects but was cal ult , c a ed to strengthen discipli"ne. in the school. 
The Supreme Court of Mi ... ss1ss1pp1 passed upon the legality of a 
d t rule 
a. op ed by the trustees of a colLDty agricultural high school requiring 
pupils to wear a prescribed u_rri.form, not only while in attendance at 
school, but also when visiting public places within five miles of the 
school and on Saturdays and Sundays. This court stated that: 
This rule is not ultra vires, unreasonable and void, and ap-
plies to all students boarding in the dormitory of the school 
and until their return to the custody of their parents. It 
applies to those students who live with their parents when 
they are in the custody of the school authorities; that is to 
say, after they leave the home of their parents to attend school 
and until they return to the home after school is over.41 
According to the decision however, the school did not have authority to 
regulate the unif arm of the pupils while they were under parental con-
trol, prior to starting them to school during the day and after the 
pupils had returned to the home from school. 
The Supreme Court of North Dakota in 1931, upheld a rule adopted by 
the Board of Education of the City of Langdon which prohibited the 
wearing of metal heelplates on shoes. The rule questioned also refused 
admittance to school of the offenders 1'!ltil the heelplates were removed. 
The plaintiff of the appeal, father of the cPJld d:i.sobeying the regula-
tion, contended that he as the parent had the right to determine the 
40Py.gsley v. Sellmeyer~ §1•, 158 Ark. 247, 250 S.W. 538. 
41Jones et §1• v. Day ~§1.·, 127 Miss. 136, 89 So. 906. 
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kind of apparel his son could wear and that the rule denied h:iJn this 
right. It was ruled that there was no abuse of authority and t he rule 
was reasonable and " ••• there was no hardship or indignity :iJnpos ed upon 
the plaintiff or his son by it. It is a:iJned at the remedying of a con-
dition which the school authorities considered detr:iJnental t o t he best 
conduct of the schoo1. 1142 
The reasonableness of a rule which required pupils participating i n 
graduation ·exercises to wear caps and gowns was ruled on by t he Supreme 
Court of Iowa in Valentine v. Independent School District of Casey, 183 
N.W. 434. Several students refused to abide by the rule contending t he 
garments possessed an obnoxious odor. The court ruled that i t was with-
in the authority of the board of education to establish such a rule ; 
however, it also ruled that the pupils defying the rule could only be 
denied the privilege of participating in the ceremony , and t he s chool 
authorities were obligated to deliver diplomas t o t he students i f they 
had met all other requirements for graduation. 
A case recently heard by the Supreme Court of Alabama also dealt 
with the right of school officials to prescribe a particular uniform. 
The appellant's daughter was suspended from the publ ic s chool f or re-
fusing to participate in the physical education program prescribed f or 
the school. Refusal was based on the ground that t he costume prescribed 
for the students while participating in t he course was "immodest and 
sinful" according to the religious beliefs of the appellant. The Ala-
bama Supreme Court held that the student on t he basis of religious pri~-
ciples 11 ••• was not required to participate in exercises whi ch would be 
42stromberg v. French et al., 60 N.D. 750 , 236 N.W. 477. 
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immodest in ordinary apparel, nor·was she required to wear a prescribed 
outfit •••• 1143 It was declared, however, that the pupil was obligated to 
attend the physical education course, and such requirarnent could not be 
considered as violating her constitutional rights. 
From the relatively few cases before the courts of record cor..=-
testing the right of school boards to establish regulations on dress and 
personal appearance of pupils it may be stated that: (1) a board of edu-
·cation may establish reasonable regulations pertaining·to personal ap-
pearance of its pupils, (2) a board of education may generally establish 
regulations pertaining to the dress of its pupils, (3) the courts will 
uphold regulations pertaining to dress and personal appearance of pupils 
unless the rule is clearly unreasonable. 
The writer has presented in Chapter III an analysis of litigation 
relating to certain requirements and regulations which must be met by a 
pupil in order to qualify for admittance and attendance in the public 
schools. Topics which have been discussed in this·chapter are: (1) Au-
thority to Prohibit Membership in Secret Societies, Fraternities, and 
Sororities, (2) Physical or Mental Defects As Grou...11.ds for Rejection or 
Exclusion of Applicants for Admission, (3) Vaccination Requirem.ent for 
Acceptance, Rejection, or Exclusion, (4) Rights of Boards of Education 
to Charge Tuition, Matriculation, or Incidental Fees, and (5) Dress and 
Personal Appearance Requirements. 
The following chapter·will include a presentation of an analysis of 
controversies brought before the courts dealing with the right of boards 
43'.M:i.tchell v. McCall et al., 143 So. (2d) 629, (1962). 
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of education to assign pupils to particular schools or classes as well 
as the right of the school officials to classify pupils on the basis of 
certain factors. 
CHAPTER rl 
BOARD'S RIGHT TO ASSIGN AND CLASSIFY PUPILS 
To this point in the study, attention has been devoted to an analy-
sis of litigation pertaining to requirements for admission and atten-
dance in the public·schools as well as the rights of boards of education 
to reject or exclude pupils from attendance for failing to abide by cer-
tain regulations. It has been held generally by the courts that chil-
dren must, in order to be eligible for free public school privileges, 
meet certain·resident and age requirements. The majority of the courts 
have also held that students, although meeting age and resident require-
ments, may be excluded from the schools for failure to submi.t to certain 
other rules and regulations. 
Another area related to pupil attendance in which there has been 
considerable litigation may be designated as the 11board 1s right to as-
sign and classify pupils." '];his section of the study is devoted to the 
analysis of court decisions pertaining to this area of law. Specifi-
cally, the topics discussed may be classified as (1) the right of boards 
of education to assign pupils to particular schools or to a particular 
attendance area, (2) the right of boards of education to assign pupils 
to a particular class or program, and (3) the right of boards of edu-
cation to classify pupils on the basis of age, scholarship, or other 
such factors. 
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Board's Right to Assign Pupils to Particular School. One of the 
most fertile fields for litigation in law related to the public schools 
in recent years involves the question of the rights of boards of educa-
tion to designate the particular school which a child may attend. The 
National Reporter lists forty-four :cases which have been before the 
courts of record since 1940. Seven of these forty-four cases have been 
decided since 1963. After ·examining the forty-four cases recorded, the 
writer of this study prepared briefs on twenty-six of the cases which 
appeared to be most pertinent to the investigation. 
Pupils, as a rule, attend the school nearest their residences which 
offers the desired level of instruction. However, the f act that a cer-
t ain school is near and convenient to his residence does not give him 
the right to attend that school. This is not an inherent right. The 
pupil has no legal right to attend a particular school merely because he 
resides in the district or because of his parents' desire for him to at-
tend a specific school. The authority to assign pupils to a specific 
school has generally been considered as coming within the broad discre-
tionary power of the boards of education. A ruling by the Supreme Court 
of New York upheld this point in 1964 when it held t hat 11 ••• the choice 
of schools must be left to the sound discretion of t he board; otherwise, 
there would be chaos in the admirlistration of the school system. 111 
Another case contesting the right of boards of education to assign 
pupils to a school not as conveniently located as another ·school in the 
same district was Galston v. School District of City of Omaha, 177 Neb. 
lKatalinic et al. v. City of Syracuse and the Board of .Educatio!l of 
the City of Syracuse, 44 Misc . (2d) 734, 254 N.Y.S. (2d) 960. 
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319, 128 N .W. (2d) 790, which came before the Supreme Court of Nebraska 
in 1964. The Omaha City School District had adjusted the attendance 
area of two new elementary schools " ••• to more evenly use their capac-
ities and facilities." As a result of the change, several students 
were transferred from one school to another. One child was forced to 
walk over two miles to and from school. His parents brought action, 
asking the court to declare the board's action void and directing the 
board to admit the child to the school in the former attendance area. 
It was held by the court that the evidence did not sustain the findings 
that the board's action in changing the boundaries was unreasonable or 
arbitrary, but was valid. 
It was ruled by the Supreme Court of Idaho in Cameron et alo v. 
Lakeland Class! School District No. 272, Kootenai County, 353 P. (2d) 
652, (1960) that the 11 ••• assigni.~g of students to certain buildings 
within the district •••• " was a matter·within the discretionary powers of 
the board of trustees of the school district. The Alabama Supreme Court 
also issued an opinion in 1964 on the board's right to assign pup1ls. 
Its judgment on the point was clearly made when it ruled: 
We point out that in regard to the placement, assig:mnent, 
and transfer.of pupils from one public school to another 
public school within a city or cour1ty school systemJ the 
Legislature of Alabama has conferred such authority on·the 
city and county boards of education, referred to as the 
11 local boards of education. 11 2 
In still another 1964 ruling, this one by the Uri-ited States Cm,:.rt 
of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, it was ruled that the board of education is 
empowered with the right to assign pupils to its schools. The 
20pinion of the Justices, 160 So. (2d) 648. 
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appellants contested the right of the Kansas City, Kansas, Board of Edu-
cation to change the attendance area boundary lines 11 ••• for the purpose 
of balancing the enrollment of the two schools involved. 11 According to 
the decision of the United States Court of Appeals, 11 The drawing of 
school zone lines is a discretionary fu..~ction of a school board and will 
be reviewed only to determine whether the school board acted arbitrar-
ily.113 It was ruled in the Kansas City case that there was no indica-
tion the board acted arbitrarily. The S:bcth Circuit, United States 
Court of Appeals agreed with the opinion expressed by the Tenth Circuit 
Court when it ruled, 11We cannot draw school zone lines. That is a dis-
cretionary function of the. school board. 11 4 This court also indicated 
that there must be evidence indicating the board abused its discretion 
or acted arbitrarily in its functioning before the courts would rule 
against them. 
In an Oklahoma case the Board of Education of the City of Vinita 
decided to close an elementary school and transfer the pupils in this 
school to other schools within the system. This decision was reached 
after it was shown that the four-room building to be closed was in need 
of repairs and did not have a cafeteria. As a matter of economy, the 
board of education elected to close the school and transfer the pupils 
in this school to other buildings. Residents opposed to closing the 
school claimed the board of education acted arbitrarily in deciding to 
close.the school without notice to the residents, that property values 
3Downs et al. v. The Board of Education of Kansas City, U.S. Ct. 
App. Tenth Circuit, 336 F. (2d) 988. -
4Northcross et al. v. Board of Education of the City of Memphis et 
al., U.S. Ct. App. S:bcth Circuit, 333 F. (2d) 661. 
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in the neighborhood would be lowered because of the closing of the 
school, and the children would be forced to cross railroad tracks in 
·order ·to reach other ·schools. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma in its 1962 
opinion concluded that closing the school and transferring the pupils to 
other ·schools was within the discretionary powers of the local board of 
education and that it had not abused its discretion in this matter.5 
A North Carolina case is one of the very few cases in which the 
courts have ruled against a board of education in the matter of assign-
ing pupils to a·particular school. In this case, Jn re Reassignment of 
Hays, 261 N.C. 616, 135 S.E. (2d) 645, the student who wished to con-
tinue in the school which she attended the previous year was denied this 
request and assigned to another ·school within the Fremont School Dis-
trict. Her ·request to continue in the same school was based on the fact 
that it offered foreign language courses which were not available in the 
school to which she was assigned. The lower court had appointed a ref-
eree who concluded that in the best interest of the girl the board 
should permit her ·to reenter her former ·school. The referee's decision 
was accepted by the lower court and it ordered the Fremont School offi-
cials to reassign the student to her former school. FI'om this rtiling 
the board of education appealed the case to the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina. The Supreme Court ruling upheld the lower court's decision 
that the board of education was unreasonable in its failure to reassign 
the pupil to her former·school in order ·that she could take advantage of 
the foreign language offerings. 
5Board of Education of City of Vinita v. City of Vinita ~ rel. 
Denney, Sup. Ct. Okla., 376 P. (2d) 256. 
A Utah Supreme Court opinion gave in detail a thorough and clear 
explanation of its reasoning "When it stated: 
In the orderly administration of the school system, to 
prevent overcrowding at some schools, to insure an adequate 
teaching faculty, rooms, seats, equipment, grounds for rec-
reation, to protect health, and secure to all children the 
greatest possible amount of contact with, and personal at-
tention from, the teachers, that their individual needs may 
be met (as well as convenience in attending school), districts 
are maintained, and even assignment of pupils within a dis-
trict to particular schools is authorized and necessary • 
••• to secure to every child in the state the maximum 
benefit of the school system, the assignment of children to 
particular schools is often essential. Economy and effi-
ciency in school operation and administration, as well as 
effectuating and making possible harmonious development and 
growth of all school children, would be seriously :impaired 
were students permitted to shift or change, at their own vo-
lition, from one school to another.6 
This opinion delivered in 1938 has generally been upheld by the courts 
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during the past quarter century, except in those cases in which evidence 
indicated the board of education acted arbitrarily or was unreasonable 
in its ruling. 
It may be stated that: (1) pupils ordinarily attend the school 
nearest their residence, (2) the board of education, not the pupil or 
parent, has the right to determine which school the pupil is to attend 3 
(3) the board of education has power, in the exercise of reasonable dis-
cretion, to designate school zone lines within the district, to deter-
mine the area that a particular school is to serve, and to require the 
students in that area to attend that particular school, and (4) the 
board of education must not act arbitrat'ily or u.,_YJ.reasonably in forming 
policies regarding the assignment of pupils. 
6Logan City School District v. Kowallis et al., 94 Utah 342, 77 P. (~) 3~. . 
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Board's Right to Assign Pupils to Particular Class. In the pre-
ceding section of this chapter it was stated that the assignment of 
pupils to particular schools within the district rests upon the local 
school officials, and the courts will not interfere with this discre-
tionary power of the boards of education unless it is shown that the 
board's action is arbitrary or unreasonable. Not only do school author-
ities generally have the discretionary authority to assign pupils to 
particular schools, but it has also been ruled that the boards of edu-
cation are charged with the responsibility of assigning pupils to var-
ious classes as they in good faith believe will best promote the 
interests of education. 
Parents legally cannot insist that their child be admitted to any 
particular class or group. A parent in New York sought through the 
courts an order compelling the board of education to admit his son, 10.7 
years of age, who had completed the sixth grade, into a two year special 
progress junior high school class. One of the requirements of the ac-
celerated program was that the students must, among other conditions, 
have reached at least 11.3 years .of age at the time school begins. The 
petitioner contended that the age factor was arbitrary and without legal 
foundation. The respondent board of education insisted that the norms 
adopted are not arbitrary and the additional year aids in the child's 
overall development. This 1962 New York Supreme Court ruled that: 
Requirement of Board of Education that pupil must be at least 
11.3 years of age for admission to the two year special pro-
gress class, which is accelerated to cover a regular three 
year junior high school course in .two years, was proper •••• 7 
7Ackerman v. Rubin et al., 35 Misc. (2d) 707, 231 N.Y.S. (2d) 112. 
Another New York case agreed with this ruling when the court declared 
that although a particular child was entitled to attend the school, 
11 ••• his parents did not have the right to insist that the child be ad-
mitted to a particular grade or class in the public school. 11 8 The 
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Supreme Court of New York-further ruled in this case that 11 ••• the board 
of education has the power to provide rules and regulations for pro-
moting from grade to grade •••• 119 
School authorities may, according to some rulings, utilize reason-
able methods to test pupils' fitness for admission to a certain grade or 
class. Such a ruling was given by the Kansas Supreme Court when it 
stated: 
That children of suitable age are entitled to attend the 
public schools at the place of their residence is not doubted, 
but the department to which they are to be assigned is a matter 
to be determined under appropriate regulations adopted by the 
governing board. The Board of Education is charged with the 
duty of making .rules for the government of the City Schools. 
It is proper, if not absolutely necessary, that some provi-
sion should be made for determining whether an applicant who 
presents himself for admission to a particular department 
has had the preliminary training to justify his assignment 
thereto. Two obvious methods for accomplishing this result 
present themselves. One is to test the prospective pupil's 
actual qualifications by an examination •••• 10 
Thus prospective pupils may be tested by examination to determine their 
qualifications for a particular class. The determination of the matter, 
according to the Kansas Court, 11 ••• is a function of school authorities, 
and its correctness, if arrived at by the exercise of their ·fair and 
8rsguith v. Levitt et al., 285 App. Div. 833, 137 N.Y.S. (2d) 497. 
9Ibid. 
lOcreyhon et al. v. Board of Education of City of Parsons, 99 Kans. 
824, 163 Pac. 145. 
,. 
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candid judgment, is not open to judicial review. 11ll 
Another problem in regard to assignment of pupils to a particular 
class arises when special classes are organized for pupils who, because 
of some physical or mental illness, are unable to participate normally 
with the group of which they would ordinarily be a member. Parents of a 
child with a speech difficulty brought an action of mandamus to compel 
the Board of Education of the City of Antigo, Wisconsin, to reinstate 
their son to the public schools of Antigo. In its opinion the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court stated that: 
It cannot be said that the school board ••• acted unreasonably 
in removing a child from a public school and placing him in 
a day school maintained ••• for the instruction of deaf persons 
or persons with defective speech •••• 12 
A ruling by the Supreme Court of New York in 1962 also held that a 
board of education has authority to assign special pupils to a school 
organized specifically to care for them when it stated, 11 Determination 
of public school officials ••• that student be sent to a special service 
school rather than continue in ju...'1.ior arts program necessarily involved 
administrative determination. 1113 
The courts of record hold, then, that a board of education may 
assign pupils to schools or special classes orgariized for handicapped 
children, and where such assignments are reasonable and will best afford 
all eligible children in their district an opportu..~ity to receive the 
benefits of an education, such assignments will be sustained by the 
llJbid. 
12state ex rel. Beattie v. Board of Education of City of Antigo, 
169 Wis. 231,172 N.W. 153. 
l3Realy v. Caine, 16 A.D. (2d) 976, 230 N.Y.S. (2d) 453. 
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courts except in a case where there is an abuse. The Ohio Supreme Court 
clearly stated this principle when it declared that: 
••• broad power and discretion are conferred upon boards of 
education to so assign pupils ••• of their district as they 
in good faith believe will best promote the interests of 
education. The court cannot control that discretion or sub-
stitute its own discretion for that of the board of education.14 
From the cases cited and discussed it may generally be stated that: 
(1) a board of education has broad discretionary power to assign pupils 
to a particular class, (2) a parent has no legal right to insist that 
his child be assigned to a particular ·class or grade, (3) a board of 
education may employ reasonable methods to test pupils' fitness for ad-
mission to a certain class or grade, and (4) the courts will not inter-
fere with this discretionary power of the board of education unless the 
board has acted unreasonably. 
Board's Right to Classify Pupils 2!l: Basis£! Scholarship,~, or 
other Factors. Not only is it within the discretionary or implied 
powers of the board of education to assign pupils to particular schools 
within the school district and to assign pupils to particular classes or 
programs within the schools, it has also been adjudicated that the clas-
sification of pupils is purely an administrative function inherent in 
.the local school authorities. The same school officials, having overall 
control and supervision of the admission of pupils to the public 
schools, generally are held to have discretionary power to adopt r1.,il.es 
and regulations classifying·pupils. 
14State ~ rel. Lewis et al. v. Board of Education of Willmi:ngton 
School Dist. et al., 137 Ohio St. 145, 28 N.E. (2d) 496. 
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The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts declared in its opinion 
.that "The right given to every child ••• to attend the public schools, is 
not unqualified, but is subject to such reasonable regulations as to ••• 
qualifications of pupils to be admitted ••• as a school committee shall 
from time to time prescribe. 1115 Determination of the work for which a 
child is prepared is a matter ·over ·which the board has jurisdiction. 
It was held by the Supreme Court of Kansas that a board of educa-
tion rule which required all persons coming from nonptlblic elementary 
schools to pass an entrance examination in order to determine the grade 
of work for·which they were qualified was a reasonable rule. "Where 
such a rule exists, 11 the court ruled, 11graduates of a parochial school 
cannot obtain a right to be admitted to the high school without an exam-
ination •••• 1116 According to this Kansas Court the establishing of such 
a rule was a function of the school authorities. 
In Williams et al. v. Zimmerman et al., 172 Md. 563,. 192 A. 353, 
the court declared that the rule of the board of education requiring the 
administering of an entrance examination to all prospective high school 
students to determine their ·qualification was held to be reasonable so 
long as all children were given equal treatment and partiality was not 
shown to any group. 
The United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, in 1963 upheld 
an Atlanta, Georgia, Board of Education policy requiring that students 
desiring to transfer to certain.schools submit to special intelligence 
15Alvord v. Inhabitants of Town of Chester, 180 Mass. 20, 61 N.E. 
263. 
16creyhon et al. v. Board of Education of City of Parsons, 99 Kans. 
824, 163 Pac. 145. 
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tests, and that their ·score must equal the average score for ,the stu-
dents in that school. Results of a scholastic ability and an achieve-
ment test routineJ.y administered to every child in the grades in 
question were used in considering the applications. Such a requirement 
was within the reaJm of authority of the school officials if adminis-
tered to all alike according to the court opinion. In commenting fur-
ther ·on its ruling the court declared that: 
The courts are ill equipped to run the schools. Litigants 
must not ignore school officials, and school officials must 
not abdicate their function to the courts. They, like the 
courts, are bound by the constitution as interpreted by the 
Supreme Court.17 
Again in 1964, this same court ruled on the right of a board of 
education to use tests in determining the placement of students. The 
Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals Justices ruled that 11 ••• it 
goes without saying that there is no Constitutional prohibition against 
an assignment of individual students ••• on a basis of intelligence, 
achievement or other aptitudes upon a uniformly administered pro-
gram •••• 1118 A similar ·decision was handed down by the Uriited States 
District Court in Youngblood et al. v. Board of Public Ln.struction of 
Bay County, .. Florida et al., 230 F. Supp. 7 4, a case in which the same 
point of law was questioned. This court sitting in 1964 again stated 
that the board of education may assign or classify individual students 
11 ••• on a basis of intelligence, rate of achievement, or aptitude upon a 
uniformly administered program." It-not only has been universally ruled 
17 Calhoun et al. v. La t:iJ:ner et al. , U. S • Ct • A pp. Fifth Circuit, 
321 F. (2d) 302:- -
18Stell et al. v. Savannah-Chatham. County Board .£!'. Education et 
al., U.S. Ct. App. Fifth Circuit, 333 F. (2d) 55. 
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by the courts that a board of education may use tests as a basis for 
·determining a pupil I s qualifications for placement in grades or class·es, 
but the courts have also ruled that a child may be excluded from school 
for not performing at a certain standard. The Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts in 1941 ruled on this point. In its opinion it stated 
that: 
••• the power ·of a school .committee to·exclude children from 
school is very broad and is to be exercised for·the "best 
interests of the pupils and of the people •••• " For·example, 
the failure of a child to maintain a .given standard of schol-
arship may justify exclusion of such child from school by 
school committee •••• 19 
Not only has it been held that school bo.ards have authority to 
classify pupils on the basis of scholarship, but classification on the 
basis of sex has also been approved. Without a doubt a classic· case, 
which has been referred to many times, is one that was heard in 1872. 
The opinion handed down clearly reflected the feeling of the court when 
it stated that: 
This general position·is, however, to be taken subject to 
the very great powers of the trustees to arrange and classify 
the schools as they deem for ·the best interests of the schol-
ars. While, · on one hand they may not deny to any resident 
person of proper age an equal participation in the benefits 
of the common schools •••• yet, on the other hand, it is per-
fectly within their ·power ••• to make such a classification, 
· whether based on age, sex, race, or any other ·existent con-
dition, as may seem .to them best.20 
It is quite evident from the opinions of the courts that a board of 
education is vested with the authority to classify pupils on the basis 
of scholarship and other facto.rs as well as having the authority to 
19cormnonwealth v. Johnson et al., 309 Mass. 476, 35 N.E. (2d) 801. 
20state ex rel. Stoutmeyer v. Duffy, 7 Nev. 342, 8 Am. Rep. 713. 
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exclude pupils from its schools if the student fails to maintain acer-
tain standard of scholarship. It has been rul.ed by one court that the 
power or authority for the placement of children may be vested in some 
other body. The Legislature of the State of Virginia has officially es-
tablished a "Pupil Placement Board" and has given this board the power 
of enrollment or placement of pupils of the schools. The petitioners, 
in a suit to compel the Fairfax County School Board to admit their chil-
dren to the County Schools, contended that the authority of enrollment 
and placement of pupils in the public schools rests with·local school 
boards and not in the HPupil Placement Board. 11 In its opinion the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia stated that: 
If the legislature deems it advisable to vest the power ·of 
enrollment or placement of pupils in an authority other than 
the local school boards, it may do so without depriving such 
local school boards of any express or :implied Constitutional 
power of supervision.21 
This case was appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States on 
the grounds that the state statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment of 
the Federal Constitution; however, the United States Supreme Court de-
clined to review the case. 
From the cases cited and discussed it is held generally that: 
(1) local boards of education are vested with discretionary power to es-
tablish regulations for classification of pupils, (2) a board of educa-
tion has the authority to classify pupils on basis of scholarship, (3) a 
board of education, it has been ruled, may classify pupils on the basis 
of sex and, (4) under statutory provisions, placement or assignment of 
21DeFebio et al. v. The County School Board of Fairfax County et 
al., 199 Va. 511, 100 S.E. (2d) 760. . 
pupils in schools may be vested in an authority other than the local 
board of education. 
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Chapter IV has been devoted to an analysis of court decisions per-
taining to: (1) Board's Right to Assign Pupils to Particular Schools, 
(2) Boa:rd 1s Right to Assign Pupils to a Particular Class and, 
(3) Board's Right to Classify Pupils on Basis of Scholarship, Sex, or 
Other Factors. The final chapter of this study will include a general 
sunnnary of the principles of law which may be drawn from the judicial 
inte:rpretations of the cases investigated. 
CHAPTER V 
GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study has been concerned with the presentation of an analysis 
of litigation which has been brought before the courts of record in re-
cent years on selected aspects of public school pupil admission and at-
tendance; namely, requirements for admission and attendance, grou..nds for 
rejection or exclusion from school attendance, and a board's right to 
assign and classify pupils. 
The writer made use of legal textbooks, American Jurisprudence, 
Corpus Juris, and Corpus Juris Secundum to determine litigation which 
has transpired in the area under investigation. The Fourth, Fifth, and 
Sixth Decennial Digests of the American Digest System were used to lo-
cate the selected cases. An investigation of the original sources was 
conduoted by the writer with the pertinent cases being categorized ac-
cording to the particular points of law u..nder study. A detailed listing 
of the facts and opinions was made of all cases determined to be perti-
nent to this study. In Chapter II, III, and IV an analysis was pre-
sented of the court decisions on litigation which has arisen between 
school officials, pupils, parents, and tax.payers of the public schools 
dealing with admission and attendance of public elementary and secondary 
school pupils. Chapter V will be devoted to the presentation of the 
findings with a summary in statement form of the principles of law 
gleaned from court interpretations of the cases investigated. 
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It was discovered that much litigation has transpired in the areas 
reviewed. Approximately two hundred cases relating to the specific top-
ics under investigation were found which had been before appeals or 
·appellate .courts during recent years. Each year, almost without excep-
tion, there has been an increase over the preceding year in the number 
·of cases litigated which pertain to.controversies dealing with public 
school pupils. 
During the approximately fifty years covered in this inquiry there 
appears to be little change in the attitudes of the courts toward the 
public school officials. The courts·still maintain, basically, that the 
local boards of education are the governing bodies of ·the public schools 
and their·powers are relatively unlimited. As long as their policies, 
:rules, and regulations are reasonable, as long as they do not conflict 
with individual rights guaranteed by the State and Federal Constitu-
tions, and as long as they are not established and enforced in an arbi-
trary manner, the courts will not enjoin their enforcement. 
Summary of Principles of Law Derived 
From the Judicial Interpretations 
The principles of law related to pupil admission and attendance 
gathered from the analysis of judicial interpretations of 'litigation 
before the courts of record in recent years give a general picture of 
the legal status of pupils, parents, and school officials. These prin-
ciples.of.law are not intended to be all..;,inclusive, but are points of 
·1aw as interpreted from opinions by particular·courts ruling on specific 
·cases. No attempt has been made to apply the principles of 'law drawn 
from the court·opinions to any particular state or area. The writer has 
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merely drawn from the opinions principles of law as determined by the 
majority of the courts. 
The findings of the principles of· 1aw in statement f o:t'm may be sum-
marized as follows: 
1. Public education is a function of the states. 
2. Attendance in the public schools is not a natural right avail-
able to a pupil merely because he is a citizen of the United 
States or of a particular state, but is a political privilege 
for the benefit of society. 
J. The privilege to attend the public schools may be extended or 
refused to any individual at the pleasure of the state. 
4. Persons desiring to take advantage of the benefits of public 
school attendance must submit to or abide by the conditions 
imposed. 
5. Free public education is available to children, otherwise eli-
gible, whose parents are residents of the school district. 
6. Residence for school purposes is considered ina broader sense 
than domicile required for voting purposes. 
7. Generally, the courts rule that a temporary residence in a dis-
trict, if for some purpose other than to take advantage of 
school privileges, is sufficient to satisfyresidence require-
ment for school purposes. 
8. Generally, it is held that a resident of an orphanage or other 
charitable institution, who has no other home, is a resident 
for school purposes of the school district in which the i:::1sti-·· 
tution is located. 
9. A child committed to the care and custody of an individual 01:. 
a more or less permanent basis is a resident for school pur--
poses in the district where he resides after co:rmnitment. 
10. Children residing ·· on property which is under the control and 
complete jurisdiction.of the United States Government are not 
entitled to free public·education in the district schools. 
11. Children residing on federal lands over ·which the Federal 
Government does not possess complete jurisdiction are entitled 
to free public education in the district schools. 
12. Generally, nonresident pupils are not entitled to free public 
school privileges. 
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13. Nonresident pupils desiring to attend the public schools may be 
required to pay tuition fees. These fees, in some cases, may 
be paid by the pupils' resident district. 
14. Generally, age requirements which must be met for free public 
school privileges are established by state legislatures. 
15. State statutes may establish requirements relative to 11 cut-off11 
dates for admittance into the schools. 
16. Many local boards of education have discretionary power to es-
tablish 11 cut-off" dates for enrollment for the first time in 
its schools. 
17. Compulsory attendance laws are common to all states. 
18. States do not have authority to require all children to attend 
public schools. Pupils may attend approved private or paro-
chial schools in lieu of attending public schools. 
19. Home instruction by a competent and qualified person, if the 
instruction is equivalent to public school education, has been 
ruled to meet compulsory attendance laws. 
20. Some states have legislation prohibiting the acceptance of home 
instruction in lieu of public school instruction. These states 
hold that, although the home instruction may be given by a 
qualified and competent teacher, this will not meet require-
ments for education of a child. Lack of free association with 
other children deemed necessary to develop the "whole child, 11 
is cited as the reason. 
21. Statutes have been enacted by some states forbidding member-
ship, of pupils in fraternities, sororities, and other secret 
societies. The courts have held that such legislation is 
valid. 
22. Other states have granted permissive legislation allowing local 
boards of education to forbid or regulate secret societies in 
the public schools. This legislation has also been held to be 
valid. 
23. Generally, it is ruJ.ed that although there is no specific leg~ 
islative enactment, local boards of education possess the broad 
discretionary powers to forbid or regulate membership infra-
ternities, sororities, or other secret societies. 
24. As a general rule, boards of education may establish regula-
tions limiting participation privileges in literary, athletic, 
and other activities of students who are members of secret 
societies. 
25. Pupils with physical and mental defects such that their pres-
ence in school disrupts or is harmful to other pupils may be 
excluded from public school attendance. 
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26. In general, courts hold that a board of education may require a 
physical examination or doctor's statement certifying to satis-
factory condition of the pupil's general health as a condition 
of admission to public school. 
27. A board of education may exclude from its schools pupils who, 
because of limited mental ability, can no longer benefit from 
common school education. 
28. Almost without exception, courts have ruled that boards of edu-
cation may require, as a prerequisite to public school admis-
sion, vaccination against communicable diseases. 
29. Statutes requiring or authorizing vaccination against communi-
cable diseases as a prerequisite to attendance in public 
schools have been held to be constitutional and not in viola-
tion of religious beliefs. There need not be a presence of, or 
a danger of, an epidemic in order ·for the requira~ent to be 
considered valid. 
30. A board of education may legally charge tuition fees to non-
resident pupils. 
31. Courts hold that public school officials may not charge tuition 
fees to resident pupils. 
32. Generally, school officials may not legally require resident 
pupils to pay fees to be used in paying teachers' salaries or 
extending school terms. 
33. Under the terms of some state statutes, a board of education 
may impose on its pupils a reasonable incidental fee. 
34. Rul.es regulating dress of pupils have been held by the courts 
to be reasonable and valid. 
35. The courts have ruled that a board of education may regulate 
personal appearance of pupils. 
36. A pupil has no legal right to attend a particular school within 
a district merely because he lives in the district. 
37. Although laws provide that all children of the state have the 
privilege to attend the public schools, it is not intended that 
this right should be unrestricted. 
38. It is a general rule that the local board of education.pos-
sesses discretionary power to adopt regulations relating to the 
assignment of pupils to particular schools. 
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39. The board of education, not the pupil or parent, has the right 
to determine the particular school to which the pupil shall be 
assigned. 
40. A board of education has the power to establish attendance area 
lines, designate the area to be served by a particular school, 
and require pupils residing within that area to attend the par-
ticular school. 
41. A board of education also has discretionary power to assign 
·pupils to·particular·classes or sections. 
42. A parent has no legal right to insist that his child be as-
signed to a particular grade or ·class. 
43. School authorities, it has been held, may utilize any reason-
able method to test a pupil's fitness. for admission to a par-
ticular class, grade, or ·section. 
44. A boat'd of education may legally assign pupils to special 
schools or classes established for physically or mentally de-
fective children. 
45. School authorities, according to the opinions of the courts, 
have the legal power to classify pupils on the basis of schol-
arship. 
46. The classification of pupils, by school officials, on the basis 
of sex and other ·factors, ha·s also been upheld by the courts. 
47. The board of education has the right to require an examination 
of all prospective students to determine grade of work for 
which the students are qualified. 
48. It has been ruled that a pupil may be excluded from school if 
he fails to maintain certain standards of achievement. 
49. It has been well established by many courts that boards of edu-
cation have general authority to make rules and regulations for 
·the effective operation of the school. The rules must be rea-
sonable and their reasonableness is determined by the circum-
stances of each particular case. 
50. Enforcement of a board rule will not be enjoined by the courts 
unless the rule is clearly unreasonable or the officials q.Cted 
arbitrarily in establishing or enforcing such rule. 
51. In determining the reasonabl.eness of a rule, a court will not 
... substitute its own discretion for that of the board of educa-
tion. 
As indicated in an earlier section of this chapter, t,he principles 
of law presented above in statement form were gleaned from court opin-
ions in specific cases. These interpretations from individual contra-
versies should be considered with extreme care before attempting to 
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apply them to any particular state or any particular situation. Statu-
tory laws, case laws, and other factors relating to the particular state 
should be carefully analyzed prior to accepting any generalization above 
as applicable to a specific point of law in any state. 
Recommendations for Further Study 
It is quite evident that one study could not possibly analyze all 
judicial interpretations of the court cases, all statutes, and all con-
stitutional laws relating to public school pupils. This study was, by 
necessity, limited to the investigation of the judicial interpretations 
from relatively recent litigation brought before the appellate courts or 
courts of record in connection with admission and attendance of public 
elementary and secondary school pupils. With the increase in the number 
of controversies between pupils, parents, taxpayers, and school offi-
cials reaching the courts, and with the ever increasing changes in our 
modern society, it will become necessary to conduct perpetual investi-
gations of this type. Not only should investigations of the judicial 
opinions continue, but studies should be conducted of constitutional and 
statutory laws on the specific topics covered in this research and in 
related areas. Areas worthy of consideration for further study are: 
An analysis of litigation pertaining.to admission and atten-
dance of pupils in institutions of higher learning. 
An analysis of constitutional laws, statutory laws, and court 
interpretations of the laws relating to pupil admission and 
attendance of individual states. 
An analysis of litigation pertaining to the legality of rules 
and regulations established by school officials related to con-
trolling conduct of pupils. 
An analysis of litigation pertaining to compulsory attendance 
laws. 
An analysis of litigation pertaining to assignment of pupils 
to bring about forced integration. 
An analysis of legal aspects involved in suspending or expelling 
pupils from the public schools~. 
An analysis of admission and attendance requirements of private 
and parochial schools. 
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